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Abstract of Thesis
In the Jaws of the Dragon: The United
States Second Infantry Division in the
Battle of the Chongchon River. Korea
November 24 - December 1. 1950

The Battle of the Chongchon River was the worst defeat
suffered by the U.S. Army since the fall of Bataan and
Corregidor in 1942, and claimed more American lives than any
other battle ever fought by the United States in the postWorld War II era.

The United States Second Infantry

Division was the principal American division engaged in this
battle, as it fought a desperate rearguard action to hold
off overwhelming numbers of Chinese soldiers in order to
allow other American and South Korean divisions to escape to
safety.
This thesis is a detailed study of the actions fought
by the United States Second Infantry Division in the Battle
of the Chongchon River.

The thesis utilizes interviews

conducted by the author with Second Division veterans of the
battle, as well as official United States Army documents and
records, to demonstrate that the valiant delaying action
fought by the Second Division in this battle greatly slowed
the Chinese Second Phase Offensive and helped to save the
Eighth United States Army in Korea from destruction.
vii
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis provides a detailed examination of the
actions fought by the United States Second Infantry Division
in the Battle of the Chongchon River, Korea.

The thesis

seeks to demonstrate that the Second Infantry Division
fought valiantly in this battle and greatly slowed the
Chinese army's Second Phase Offensive, and therefore helped
prevent the Chinese from accomplishing their strategic
objective of destroying the Eighth United States Army.
This thesis introduces new information on the Battle of
the Chongchon River, gathered from the author's interviews
and correspondence with sixteen veterans of the U.S. Second
Infantry Division who fought in the battle.

The thesis is

also based on a thorough examination of the U.S. Army's
official records of the Battle of the Chongchon River, and a
comprehensive study of the existing literature on the
subject.
The Battle of the Chongchon River was the worst defeat
suffered by the United States Army since the surrender of
Bataan and Corregidor in 1942, and it precipitated the
longest retreat in the history of the U.S. Army.

In the

forty-three years that have passed since the fight at the
Chongchon, no battle has claimed more American lives.

The

Second Infantry Division not only suffered more casualties
1
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than any other division in this battle, but also received
the most post-battle criticism.
Controversy has surrounded the Battle of the Chongchon
River from the moment it ended.

Only weeks after the fight

at the Chongchon was over, the United States Army launched a
formal investigation into the reasons for the American
defeat there.

The commanding general of the Second Infantry

Division, Major General Laurence Keiser, was relieved of
command by his superior Eighth Army commander Lieutenant
General Walton Walker.

Both Walker and his superior,

supreme commander General Douglas MacArthur, were also
heavily criticized for the mistakes they made during the
battle.

Yet in spite of its importance in American military

history, there has been little scholarly interest in the
Battle of the Chongchon River.
I was inspired to write about the Battle of the
Chongchon River in 1987 when, as an undergraduate student
majoring in History at the University of Nebraska at Omaha,
I read a best-selling book by the British author Max
Hastings entitled The Korean War.1 Hastings' book was well
received both in Britain and the United States, and it was
made a selection of the History Book Club and the Military
History Book Club.

After reading the book I was disturbed

by many of Hastings' negative, and unsubstantiated, comments
about the United States Army.

His chapter on the Battle of
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the Chongchon River especially outraged me.
When he wrote on the Battle of the Chongchon River in
his book The Korean War , Hastings completely ignored the
desperate delaying action fought by the Second Infantry
Division from November 25-29, 1950, and instead focused his
attention on the disaster which befell the division on
November 30th along the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road.

Hastings

alleges that the Second Infantry Division performed in a
cowardly fashion during the battle, and his convoluted prose
drips with anti-American rhetoric, most of which is
completely undocumented.2
Among other allegations, Hastings makes the outlandish
charge that panic stricken soldiers from the Second Infantry
Division inflicted casualties on the British 27th
Commonwealth Brigade, as they fired wildly, running away
from the Chinese ambush.3 This statement is not footnoted,
and there is absolutely no evidence to support this charge.
The statement by Hastings is especially infuriating as, by
his own accounting, the British suffered only 31 casualties
in this battle.

By contrast the U.S. Second Infantry

Division lost over 4,500 men in the Battle of the Chongchon
River, more casualties than the British would suffer during
the entire Korean War.

This is a typical example of

Hastings poor scholarship on the battle in particular, and
the Korean War in general.

4

Lieutenant Colonel Walter Killilae, who assisted
Hastings in some of his research, later wrote to me stating
that he very much regretted having helped Hastings.
Killilae stated that much of what he told Hastings was
twisted by that author, and taken out of context.

Among

other misrepresentations, Hastings even misspells Killilae's
name!4
As I began my research on the Battle of the Chongchon
River, I consulted Keith McFarland's excellent work The
Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography.

This bibliography

contains a comprehensive listing of books, articles,
personal memoirs, and doctoral dissertations which have as
their subject any facet of the Korean War.

Of its

approximately 2,500 entries, there are only 3 which pertain
specifically to the Battle of the Chongchon River.5
One of these entries is an article written by John
Fralish entitled "Roadblock" which appeared in the now
defunct Combat Forces Journal in 1953.6 The other two
entries are both by S.L.A. Marshall.

The first is an

article, also published in Combat Forces Journal, entitled
"They Fought to Save Their Guns."

This article was actually

an excerpt from Marshall's then forthcoming book The River
and the Gauntlet, and this volume is the third and final
entry in McFarland's list on the Battle of the Chongchon
River.7

5

Because McFarland's bibliography appeared in 198 6, I
thoroughly searched the abstracts of articles published from
1984 to the present on Korean, Military, and U.S. History.
This search revealed no journal articles on the battle.
Continuing my search for information, I contacted University
Microfilms Incorporated (UMI), the primary source for
obtaining copies of doctoral dissertations and master's
theses.

UMI personnel sent me a computer printout of their

thorough search of their computer databanks which contain
dissertations and theses going back to the turn of the
century.

Therein no dissertation or thesis was found which

discussed the Battle of the Chongchon River.8
Two books that provide detailed coverage of the Battle
of the Chongchon River have appeared since the publication
of McFarland's bibliography: Roy Appleman's Disaster in
Korea and Billy Mossman's official U.S. Army history Ebb and
Flow.9 I found both of these books to be invaluable in the
preparation of my thesis.

Although these books cover broad

areas of the Korean War, they nevertheless stand with S.L.A.
Marshall's River and the Gauntlet, as the best sources for
information on the battle.
As part of its investigation into the reasons for the
American defeat at the Battle of the Chongchon River, the
U.S. Army sent Brigadier General (then Colonel) S.L.A.
Marshall to Korea in December 1950, to interview men who had
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fought in the battle.

Marshall later turned these

interviews into a book, The River and the Gauntlet, which
was published in 1953.

This volume remains today as the

only book to devote itself entirely to the Battle of the
Chongchon River.

Since many of the U.S. Army's official

records were destroyed in the fighting and in the subsequent
withdrawal from North Korea, Marshall's book has stood for
four decades as the primary source for information on the
f ight at the Chongchon River.10
Although an invaluable source for first hand accounts
of the fighting, Marshall's work does have its weaknesses.
The main fault in Marshall's work is that it is not
footnoted at all and aside from mentioning his interviews,
Marshall does not cite any other sources for his
information.

I have read Marshall's book several times and

have concluded from the information he presents that he did
use at least some of the official U.S. Army records,
although he himself does not mention this.
Marshall's work is further limited by the fact that it
was written and published while the Korean War was still
going on.

As a result much of Marshall's information,

especially on the Chinese army, is vague and even incorrect.
For example only in rare instances does Marshall mention
Chinese unit designations.

When a Chinese army unit is

mentioned by its designation, like the CCF 94th Infantry
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Regiment, the information is usually incorrect.

I have made

extensive use of U.S. Army documents on the battle which
were still classified as "Secret” at the time Marshall's
book appeared and have drawn on official U.S. Army records
to document the Chinese order of battle as well.
As part of my research for this thesis, I located and
corresponded with several key figures who appear in
Marshall's book.

I interviewed many of these men, and other

veterans with whom they put me in touch with, at the 72nd
Annual Reunion of the Second "Indianhead" Division
Association, held in Ft. Worth, Texas from July 21-25, 1993.
These men offered not only a unique perspective on the
battle but also interesting insights into Marshall's
research methods.

All of these men agreed that Marshall's

book gave an accurate portrayal of the battle, and all
offered laudatory praise of Marshall.

The weakness in

Marshall's interviews was the atmosphere of suspicion in
which they were conducted.

As Colonel Reginald Hinton

explained to me:
We thought they [Marshall's investigation team]
were trying to blame someone for the loss of the
battle, and we didn't want to get anybody in
trouble. So it's not that I lied or anything like
that, it's just that I didn't offer any additional
information either. I answered the questions they
put to me with little or no comment.11
Not all of the men mentioned in Marshall's work were
actually interviewed by him.

Some were placed in the book
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as part of an interview gathered from another individual.
For example Lieutenant William "Sam" Mace makes a prominent
appearance in Marshall's chapter on the Chinese ambush along
the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road.

Mace's first name is

erroneously given as 11Jim11 in the book, because the unnamed
individual who Marshall interviewed provided inaccurate
information.

Since Marshall has been relied upon as the

primary source of information on the battle, other authors
have quoted Marshall and compounded his mistake by also
referring to Mace as either Jim or James.12 I personally
interviewed Sam Mace, and his testimony on the battle
differs from that attributed to him by Marshall's unnamed
source.

I have incorporated this new testimony into the

thesis along with his correct name.
Roy Appleman's Disaster in Korea is a ponderously
written work on Eighth Army's campaign in northwest Korea
from mid-November to mid-December 1950.

Appleman was the

first U.S. Army historian of the Korean War and in this
position authored the mammoth South to the Naktoncr. North to
the Yalu. which is the official account of the Korean War
from June 25th, 1950 to November 24th, 1950.13 Although
originally scheduled to write the next volume covering the
Battle of the Chongchon River, as well as X Corps' battle at
the Chosin Reservoir, Appleman left the project.

Many years

later Appleman began writing again as a private citizen, and
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in rapid succession published several works on the Korean
War, using material he had originally gathered when assigned
to the project by the U.S. Army.
Disaster in Korea, published in 1989, is Appleman's
book covering the Battle of the Chongchon River and it is
superior to Marshall's work on the same subject in several
ways.

The most readily noticeable difference is that

Appleman extensively footnotes and documents his sources for
information.

These sources are almost exclusively U.S. Army

documents and letters that Appleman collected from senior
officers in his capacity as the official historian of the
battle.

In its use of primary documents, Appleman's work is

without parallel.
The weakness in Appleman's work is a lack of
originality in his accounts of small unit actions.

Despite

a rather sharp critique of Marshall's book that Appleman
includes in his discussion of sources, Appleman repeatedly
lifts whole sections from Marshall's work to describe the
fighting.

This is somewhat surprising considering the

quality of Appleman's scholarship throughout most of the
book.

As mentioned previously this thesis includes not only

new interviews with the men in Marshall's (and Appleman's)
book, but also new interviews with men who never spoke with
Marshall.

Consequently, the small unit actions described in

this thesis are completely original and do not appear in any
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other writing on the Battle of the Chongchon River.
In regard to sources of information on the Battle of
the Chongchon River Appleman makes the comment:
It is a matter of regret that some of the Engineer
survivors (2nd Engineer Combat Battalion) did not
leave a record or that a report was not assembled
soon after the event and made a part of the
official records of the 2nd Division. Such a
record would have revealed details of this unit's
valor below Kunu-ri in the afternoon and evening
of 30 November 1950.14
This thesis includes interviews and correspondence with
four members of the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion who
survived the Battle of the Chongchon River, and it is with a
great sense of honor that I add their testimony to the body
of literature on this battle.
When Appleman left the U.S. Army's historical project
on the Korean War, the task of providing the official
account of the Battle of the Chongchon River was delegated
to Billy C. Mossman.

Progressing in fits and starts

Mossman's book Ebb and Flow took almost a quarter century to
complete, finally being published in 199 0.15 Mossman's
official history is comparable to Appleman's book in the
sense that they both used many of the same U.S. Army
documents as sources.

Mossman's work is more general than

Appleman's or Marshall's, as it covers the Korean War from
November, 1950 - July, 1951.

Thus only two chapters of the

book deal with the Battle of the Chongchon River.
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Mossman's book does a wonderful job of describing the
Battle of the Chongchon River in the sense of its strategic
importance to the entire United Nations command in Korea.
At the same time, because the book is written at an
operational/strategic level, there is extremely scanty
coverage of fighting at battalion level and lower.

The few

accounts of such actions that Mossman does provide are in
the main drawn from Marshall's The River and the Gauntlet.
As mentioned previously, I have used my own interviews to
provide information on tactical operations as well as
official U.S. Army records, although I have interpreted many
of these records differently than Mossman or
Appleman.
There are several general histories of the Korean War
which provide good coverage of the Battle of the Chongchon
River.

Chief among these is T.R. Fehrenbach's This Kind of

War.16 Fehrenbach commanded a rifle company in the Second
Infantry Division during the Korean War and his book
provides an excellent narrative on the Battle of the
Chongchon River.

Although he relies heavily on Marshall for

much of his information, Fehrenbach nevertheless provides
some new data as well.
Bevin Alexander, another former U.S. Army historian of
the campaign, gives a good (albeit brief) account of the
battle in his provocatively titled Korea: The First War We
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Lost.17 Clay Blair's The Forgotten War is a wonderful
source of information on the Korean War, and he provides an
incredible amount of biographical detail on U.S. Army
officers down to battalion level.

Blair also gives a solid

and detailed account of the Battle of the Chongchon River,
although he, like most others, relies almost exclusively on
S.L.A. Marshall for his information.
As the son of a machinegunner who fought at the
Chongchon River, I grew up with the stories of gallantry,
cowardice, brilliance and stupidity that made up this
terrible battle.

When I reached adulthood and began to

investigate the battle from a military historian's
perspective, I combed through archival collections reading
lengthy war diaries, and intelligence reports.

I was very

disappointed to discover that in addition to the horrendous
human loss suffered by the Second Division at the Chongchon
River, many original documents had also been lost in the
fighting.

For example, the records of the Second Division's

ordeal in the retreat from Kunu-ri on the final day of the
battle were mere sketchy outlines composed months after the
event.

Only Marshall's The River and the Gauntlet provided

any information at all on the ambush below Kunu-ri.
I therefore decided that the only way to form an
accurate picture of what had happened to the Second Infantry
Division along the banks of the Chongchon River in November

13

1950, was to seek out and interview the men who were
actually there.

I was able to find many of these men and

interview them at great length concerning their experiences
in the battle.

I consider these interviews to be the

greatest contribution of this thesis to the literature on
the Battle of the Chongchon River.
Because of the heavy casualties suffered by the Second
Infantry Division at the Chongchon River and because some
veterans of the fight have died during the past forty-three
years, I was extremely pleased to be able to locate so many
survivors of the battle.

Many of these men told me that

only because my late father had fought in the battle with
them, were they willing to speak with me about this
extremely traumatic event in their lives.
For many of these men, including my father, this battle
was the most horrible of all in which they fought.

Several

veterans told me about having "flashbacks" about the battle,
and many suffered from nightmares for years afterwards.

All

this helps demonstrates how war scars the soul of a man as
much as it scars his body.
I believe the tales of these men give a human face to
the mere numbers of troops and casualties which historians
often impersonally bandy about as if they were cardboard
pieces on a game table.
stories are real.

These men are real, and their

Some are heroes and others just ordinary
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soldiers.

But what they all have in common, is that they

were combat soldiers who fought at the Battle of the
Chongchon River.

When their country called, these men

answered, and on the killing ground of Korea they fought
this nation's enemies with rifle, machinegun, and even bare
fists.
The only reward
tale be told so

these veterans seek now is that their

that future

generations of Americansmight

know the price that they and other vaterans paid for the
freedom we now enjoy.

Robert Hammersmith, who served with

the Second Division in the battle, told me:
I feel it's great what you're doing about this
because like they say it's the 'Forgotten War'.
You mention it to people and they don't know what
the hell you mean. They don't realize how many
people got killed over there. They have no idea
what the guys went through over there. I'm glad
to see you do something like this because
somebody's got to get this stuff and document it,
and put it down to let the damn people know.18
Above all else,

this thesis

presents the story of these

forgotten soldiers of the "Forgotten War."
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CHAPTER I
WAR IN A DISTANT LAND
Leaves of autumn hurrying through the courtyard—
Last year the patter of dancing footsteps.
This year the sound of falling tears.
Deep red maples mirrored in still, deep water—
Last year the heart of a happy poet.
This year the blood of a warrior slain.
Yi Soong-in, "Autumn Song", 14th Century Korea

On November 23, 1950, Thanksgiving Day was celebrated
by the men of the United States Second Infantry Division,
8,000 miles from home in the heart of North Korea.

The

Second Division was part of a multi-national force deployed
to the Korean peninsula, under the authority of the United
Nations, to repel the invasion of South Korea by communist
North Korea.1 The Second Division had seen heavy fighting
during three months in Korea, but little did its men know
that their greatest trial lay ahead.

In the next week, the

men of the Second Division would be engaged in the Battle of
the Chongchon River, the largest and most important battle
they had ever fought in Korea.

Although Americans would

little remember this battle, the survival of the United
States Eighth Army in Korea came to depend in large part on
the fighting abilities of the men of the United States
Second Infantry Division.
The United States Second Infantry Division was
commanded by Major General Laurence Keiser, a West Point
17
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graduate (Class of 1917) and a decorated combat veteran of
the First World War.2 The Second Division was composed of
the 9th Infantry Regiment, 23rd Infantry Regiment, and 38th
Infantry Regiment.

There were also artillery, tank, and

engineer battalions attached to the Second Division, which
brought the total strength of the division at the time of
the Battle of the Chongchon River to approximately 15,000
men.3
A U.S. Army infantry division in 1950 was composed of
three infantry regiments, each with an authorized strength
of approximately 3,700 men.

These three regiments were the

principal combat units of the division.

Each regiment was

comprised of three battalions, and each of these battalions
contained four companies.

In addition to the infantry

regiments, there were usually four artillery battalions (of
18 guns each) assigned to an infantry division, although
this varied greatly during the Korean War.

A tank

battalion, and an engineer battalion were also attached to
an infantry division, along with medical, communication, and
transport companies.
The Second Infantry Division had been in continous
service as a component of the U.S. Army, since the division
was first activated in 1917.

The Second Division had an

enviable combat record in both World Wars, and was retained
as an active unit in the wake of U.S. demobilization
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following World War II.

The men serving with the Second

Infantry Division in 1950, were volunteers drawn from all
parts of the United States.

The Second Division was

stationed at Ft. Lewis, Washington on June 25, 1950, when
news arrived that the communist Democratic People's Republic
of (North) Korea had invaded the Republic of (South) Korea.4
President Harry Truman interpreted the North Korean
attack as but another move by a pawn of the Soviet Union in
the Soviet Unions's quest for world domination.

As Republic

of Korea (ROK) forces collapsed and the North Korean
People's Army (NKPA) began to overrun the south, Truman
decided the United States had to halt this aggression and
ordered the commitment of American forces to the Korean
peninsula.

At the same time, Truman called for an emergency

session of the United Nations Security Council and
immediately proposed that its members commit forces to the
struggle as well.

The Security Council passed this proposal

and established a United Nations command under General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur who was designated as Supreme
Commander.5
Shortly afterward, the United States Second Infantry
Division had been alerted for overseas deployment and was
shipped to Korea, arriving in August 1950.

Within days of

its arrival in Korea, the Second Division joined in the
vicious struggle raging around the vital South Korean port
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of Pusan.
In fierce battles with the North Koreans along the
Naktong River, the men of the Second Infantry Division
received their baptism of fire.

The Second Division

performed well in these early battles, and played a major
role in defeating the North Korean attempts to break through
to Pusan.

In one incredible week from August 31 - September

5, 1950, seven men from the Second Infantry Division won
their nation's highest award for bravery in battle, the
Medal of Honor.6
On September 15, 1950, United States forces landed
behind North Korean lines at the port of Inchon cutting NKPA
supply routes to North Korea, and the disintegration of the
North Korean army began.

Within a matter of weeks, North

Korean resistance in occupied South Korea had collapsed, and
United States, ROK, and other United Nations forces were
fighting their way northward.7
Flushed with success, President Truman and General
MacArthur made the decision to cross into North Korea and
win a complete victory by conquering the communist
aggressors.8 On September 30, 1950, the ROK 3rd Division
crossed the 38th Parallel which formed the boundary between
North and South Korea.

Within days United States and other

United Nations forces followed, and the United Nations
attempt to conquer North Korea had begun.

Unheeded in the
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euphoria of victory, were ominous warnings that began to be
issued by North Korea's fellow communist neighbor to the
north, the People's Republic of China.

Communist China

Fresh from its victory over the U.S.-backed
Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War, Mao Zedong's
communist regime in China interpreted all American
intentions in Asia in the worst possible light.

The thought

of a U.S.-led coalition of armed forces sweeping towards
their border sparked fear in the Chinese.

The destruction

of a fellow communist nation in Asia could also have serious
implications for China.

If North Korea could be destroyed,

the Chinese reasoned, then the United States might begin to
think in terms of "rolling back" communism in Asia, and
China would be next on its list.9
On October 2, 1950, Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai
sent a message to the United Nations through the Indian
ambassador to China in which Zhou warned that if any nonKorean forces crossed into North Korea, China would consider
itself obliged to intervene in the war.10 Neither MacArthur
nor the Truman administration were impressed with this
warning, and both considered it to be a bluff.

Several days

later, the first American forces crossed into North Korea.
Over the years, many scholars have argued that if only
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South Korean Forces alone had crossed the 38th Parallel into
North Korea, China would not have intervened in the war.
This argument has been destroyed by the remarkable findings
presented by Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai in
their book, Uncertain Partners: Stalin. Mao, and the Korean
War.

Taking advantage of the new academic freedom in the

former Soviet Union, Goncharov and his colleagues gained
access to previously unavailable Soviet documents, including
a cache of messages exchanged by Mao and Soviet Premier
Joseph Stalin just before China's entry into the Korean War.
In a telegram dated October 2, 1950, the same date that
Zhou issued his warning and before American forces had
entered North Korea, Mao informed Stalin that "We (Chinese)
have decided to send some of our troops to Korea under the
name of Chinese People's Volunteers to fight the United
States and its lackey (ROK President) Syngman Rhee and to
aid our Korean comrades."11
Soon afterward, the Chinese began secretly deploying
vast armies across the Yalu River into North Korea.

Mao

appointed General Peng Dehuai as commander-in-chief of the
Chinese forces deployed to Korea.

On October 14th, 1950,

Peng told his troops why they were being sent to fight in
Korea:
The U.S. imperialists are employing seven
divisions and the lackey troops of Syngman Rhee in
unbridled aggression against the Korean
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revolutionary government and people. Having
crossed the 38th Parallel, the enemy is continuing
to advance northward with all his might. We will
actively support the North Korean people to oppose
the aggressors and help them strive for
independence, freedom, and liberation. If we do
not dispatch troops to actively support the Korean
revolutionary government and people, the
reactionaries at home and abroad will be swollen
with arrogance. We will be put under direct
threat if U.S. imperialism should occupy all of
Korea.12
Shortly after the capture of the North Korean capital
of Pyongyang, elements of Lieutenant General Walton Walker's
Eighth United States Army encountered Chinese soldiers for
the first time near the village of Unsan, North Korea.

In a

desperate battle lasting from October 25th - November 6th,
1950, a ROK division and a U.S. regiment were badly mauled
by the Chinese.

The United Nations offensive north was

halted in its tracks, as U.S. and ROK units pulled back into
defensive positions to counter an anticipated all-out
assault by the Chinese.

Then as suddenly as they had

appeared, the Chinese broke contact with United Nations
forces and faded back into the bleak hills of North Korea.13
A strange calm descended over Korea.

After

approximately two weeks of only sporadic contact by American
and ROK forces with the Chinese, MacArthur decided that the
initial intervention by the Chinese army had been nothing
but a bluff.

On November 24, 1950, he ordered a resumption

of the United Nations offensive with the intention of
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pushing north to the Chinese border and bringing all of
North Korea under United Nations control.14
Repeated American aerial reconnaissance of the area
between the UN lines and the Chinese border revealed no
large enemy troop concentrations.15 Ominously though,
Chinese pilots flying the most modern Soviet fighter
aircraft, the Mig-15, began making repeated sorties from air
bases in China against American reconnaissance flights over
North Korea.

In spite of this provocation, the Truman

administration adhered to its policy of prohibiting U.S.
aircraft from entering Chinese airspace to engage the enemy
planes or to attack their bases.16
On November 9, 1950, an American RB-2 9 propeller driven
reconnaissance plane was attacked over North Korean airspace
near the Yalu River by two Chinese Mig-15's and was so badly
damaged that it crashed while attempting to land at its
airbase.

After this incident, the United States Air Force

forbade the use of the slow RB-2 9's near the Chinese border
due to their vulnerability to attack.

The U.S. Air Force,

with only three squadrons of jet propelled reconnaissance
aircraft in Asia, had severely limited intelligence
gathering capacity.17
Additionally, in the days before the resumption of the
United Nations offensive, billowing black smoke from forest
fires covered large areas of North Korea, further hampering
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aerial reconnaissance.

U.S. reconnaissance planes had

spotted similar fires just before the battle with the
Chinese at Unsan, and U.S. Army intelligence was gradually
becoming aware that

the Chinese setthese fires in order

mask daylight troop

movements. The

to

Chinese were drawing a

cloak of secrecy over their vast armies massing in North
Korea.18
On November 23, 1950, MacArthur's military intelligence
chief, Major General Charles Willoughby, estimated that
there were between 44,000 and 70,000 Chinese soldiers in all
of Korea, along with scattered remnants of the North Korean
army.

According to

Koreans intended to

Willoughby, the Chinese and North
fight a delaying action with United

Nations forces, while retreating north into China.

This

estimate of communist strength and intentions was accepted
by both Lieutenant General Walton Walker's Eighth Army in
Korea, as well as by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Washington, D.C.19
Although correct in its estimate of North Korean
strength, both MacArthur's military intelligence gravely
underestimated Chinese strength and intentions.

By November

23, 1950, approximately 300,000 Chinese soldiers had entered
Korea and rather than retreating, this massive force was
preparing to launch its own offensive.20
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November 23, 1950

On November 23, 1950, the United Nations forces
celebrated Thanksgiving Day, with what many would later
describe as the best meal they ever had in Korea.

Even

frontline troops were served turkey with all the trimmings.
A joyous mood of optimism prevailed among all U.N. forces
regarding their imminent attack north, and talk of victory
parades in Tokyo and being home by Christmas flew up and
down the grapevine.

Sharing this jubilant mood were the

officers and men of the United States Second Infantry
Division.21
The Second Infantry Division was a component of the
Eighth United States Army in Korea.

On November 23, 1950,

the Eighth Army was comprised of:
I Corps: U.S. 24th Infantry Division, British 27th
Commonwealth Brigade, ROK 1st Division
IX Corps: U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, U.S. 25th
Infantry Division, Turkish Brigade
ROK II Corps: ROK 6th Division, ROK 7th Division,
ROK 8th Division
Eighth Army Reserve: U.S. 1st Cavalry Division,
U.S. 187th Airborne Regiment, British 29th
Brigade, Filipino Battalion, Thai Battalion.22
Walker's plan of attack called for all three corps to
advance abreast of one another with I Corps in the west, IX

27

Corps in the center, and the ROK II Corps in the east.

The

Eighth Army reserve would follow behind the advancing corps
and be prepared to either exploit any sudden enemy collapse,
or reinforce a threatened sector of the line, as events
warranted.23
Further to the east of Eighth Army, across the rugged
Myomyang Mountain range, the U.S. X*Corps was deployed in
northeastern Korea.

Because U.N. forces lacked the manpower

to establish a solid frontline across the Korean peninsula,
Eighth Army and X Corps would be fighting their own
individual battles out of touch with one another.24
Communist opposition to the U.N. offensive seemed to be
a remote possibility because no Chinese had been encountered
in over two weeks, and no United Nations unit had engaged a
North Korean force larger than a regiment since October.
Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker
perceived the main obstacles to his advance to be the rugged
hills and steep valleys, which made overland marching
through North Korea an extremely arduous task.

In addition,

the broken terrain made radio communication between units
extremely difficult and made physical contact virtually
impossible.25

November 24, 1950

On November 24, 1950, General of the Army Douglas
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MacArthur issued the following communique from his
headquarters in Tokyo, Japan:
The United Nations massive compression envelopment
in North Korea against the new Red armies
operating there is now approaching its decisive
effort. This morning the western sector of the
pincer [Eighth Army] moves forward in general
assault in an effort to complete the compression
and close the vise. If successful this should for
all practical purposes end the war, restore peace
and unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal
of United Nations military forces, and permit the
complete assumption by the Korean people and
nation of full sovereignty and international
equality. It is that for which we fight.26
With those words, the great United Nations offensive to end
the war in Korea began.
As part of the Eighth Army's advance in northwestern
Korea, the United States Second Infantry Division moved
north on November 24 with its regiments in an inverted
pyramid battle formation: the 9th Infantry Regiment on the
west, the 38th Infantry Regiment on the east, and the 23rd
Infantry Regiment and division artillery to the south.

This

great offensive punch by the Second Infantry Division
encountered only the expected sporadic skirmishing by small
retreating enemy units.27
After making solid advances against little to no
resistance on November 24th, the U.N. offensive resumed at
dawn on November 25th.

Eighth Army units in the west again

made excellent progress, encountering virtually no
opposition.

Although to the east of the Second Infantry
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Division, Major General Yu Hae Ueng reported to Eighth Army
Headquarters that his ROK II Corps was encountering heavy
enemy resistance.28 These reports from the South Koreans
were not taken seriously by Eighth Army Headquarters.

With

some justification, the U. S. Army had a low regard for the
abilities of the South Korean soldiers.

What the

undertrained and underequipped ROK's regarded as "heavy
resistance" could be the same amount that United States
troops regarded as "light."
The Second Infantry Division also ran into a sharp
fight on November 25th at its northernmost point of advance,
Hill 219 which lay alongside the main road leading north
through the valley of the Chongchon River.

In a fight which

lasted all day on November 25th, Company B of the 9th
Infantry Regiment was able to secure only part of the hill
against determined resistance by enemy troops positively
identified as being Chinese.29 Despite this engagement,
Second Division Headquarters seems to have been no more
alarmed by developments than Eighth Army was.30
As the frigid darkness of an autumn night fell across
the rugged hills of North Korea on November 25th, 1950, the
temperature dropped to 20 degrees fahrenheit.

The icy winds

blowing out of the sub-arctic wastes of Manchuria made it
feel much colder.31 The men of the Second Infantry Division
shivered as they lay on the open ground, but still, most
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kept their optimism.

The delay at Hill 219 was only

temporary, many of the men thought, and soon this whole
damned business would be over.
But what if the Chinese had not retreated like
MacArthur was telling them?

What if the Chinese were still

there, watching and waiting for the moment to strike?

If

that were true then there would be Hell to pay for the over
optimism of MacArthur, the political miscalculations of
Truman, and the soldiers own lack of caution.
would be Hell to pay.

Indeed there

And on the night of November 25,

1950, the blare of Chinese bugles announced that Hell had
come to collect.
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CHAPTER II
NIGHT OF THE DRAGON
"Let your plans be as dark and impenetrable as night
and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt."
Sun Tze, The Art of War

Shortly after dark, on the evening of November 25,
1950, the 30,000 Chinese soldiers of General Han Kuang-chu's
Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) 40th Army emerged from their
hiding places in the caves, mineshafts, and villages of the
North Korean countryside.

The CCF 40th Army was considered

by Chinese military leaders to be the finest unit in their
army, and as such it was chosen to lead the Chinese Second
Phase Offensive in the west.

The target of Han's assault

was the United States Second Infantry Division, then
deployed opposite his 40th Army, along the valley of the
Chongchon River.1
The men of Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry
Regiment, Second Infantry Division held a small hill astride
the main axis of the CCF 40th Army's attack.

Expecting to

renew their own offensive north the following morning,
"Charlie" Company had not dug defensive positions but rather
took advantage of whatever natural cover was available.

On

the far right of the company, PFC Robert B. Bruce aided his
gun crew in setting up their .30-caliber machinegun in a
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small depression near the top of the hill.
little

It provided

cover, but was better than nothing at all.

Since

Bruce and his crew did not plan on staying in the position
long, they were not too concerned about the lack of
defensive preparations.2
Approximately one hundred yards to Bruce's left,
Corporal Alvin G. Moore helped his squad set up their .3 0caliber machinegun.

Moore wasn't concerned about an enemy

attack that night either, as he was more worried about
staying warm.3 Icy winds howled through the valleys of
North Korea, and swirled about the hilltop position of
Charlie Company, cutting right through the summer uniforms
that the men had been wearing since arriving in Korea in
August.

Pile caps were the one item of winter clothing that

had been universally issued to the frontline troops.

Other

cold weather gear was still being distributed at the time of
the attack north, and many units had yet to receive their
issue.4
All was quiet when, from out of the frigid night, the
blare of Chinese bugles startled the men of Company C.
Almost simultaneously mortar fire began to land on their
positions.

Men scrambled from sleeping bags and struggled

to put on their boots, tripping over each other in the
darkness.

Bruce was already awake, as he had been on watch

when the Chinese attack began.

Bruce quickly threw back the
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bolt on his .30-caliber machinegun, locking and loading the
weapon, his eyes searching for enemy movement in the moonlit
darkness.5
Suddenly, Chinese soldiers leapt up no more than 30
yards from Bruce's gun position, and using their peculiar
underhand sidearm throw, hurled a volley of grenades at him.
Bruce opened fire with his machinegun while the grenades
were still in midair, cutting down several of the Chinese
grenadiers before they regained cover.

The grenades

themselves fell short of Bruce's position, and exploded
harmlessly on the frozen earth.

In this battle, and in the

coming battles in Korea, Chinese soldiers would prove to be
notoriously weak-armed grenade throwers.6
Behind the Chinese grenadier skirmishers, Bruce could
see the main Chinese assault force moving up the hill at him
in large waves of men, firing their rifles and submachineguns as they came.

The staccato bursts of the

enemy's small arms fire added their lethality to the ghastly
orchestra of battle, whose sounds filled the frozen night
air on Charlie Company's hill.

Bruce swung his .30-caliber

machinegun in a wide arc, bringing the attacking Chinese
under fire, and killing or wounding dozens of them.

But the

holes in the Chinese lines were rapidly filled, as the
seemingly endless lines of enemy soldiers continued to close
on Bruce's position.7
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On the left flank of Charlie Company, Alvin Moore was
also firing on the Chinese infantry with his .30-caliber
machinegun.

Moore recalled inflicting heavy casualties on

the Chinese infantry.

But onward the Chinese came, running

full speed, hurling grenades, and firing their deadly submachineguns.

The Chinese assault wave swept right over

Moore's gun position, as the enemy soldiers went running
past him on either side.8
In daylight, American airstrikes could have wreaked
havoc on the dense Chinese formations.

But the Chinese

attack along the Chongchon River, as all their offensives in
the Korean War, came at night.

In 1950 few American

aircraft were capable of flying close support missions at
night, because of their inability to identify and
distinguish between enemy and friendly forces in the
darkness.
The Second Infantry Division had six battalions of
artillery attached to it, and one of these, the 37th Field
Artillery, began to provide supporting fire to the 9th
Infantry Regiment.9 Like close air support, the artillery
could only be directed against Chinese targets not in close
proximity to friendly forces, for fear of hitting their own
men.

The Chinese were well aware of the limitations that

night operations and close combat placed on American forces,
and had tactics designed to exploit these weaknesses to the
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utmost.

The commander-in-chief of the Chinese forces in

Korea, Peng Dehuai, told his men on the eve of their entry
into the Korean War:
Our resolute and brave tactical operations consist
in having the courage to fight close combat using
dynamite, fighting the enemy with bayonets, and
throwing hand grenades. The enemy is afraid of
such operations.10
Deprived of its air support, and unable to use its
supporting artillery effectively, the U.S. 9th Infantry
Regiment was forced to engage an enemy force of overwhelming
numerical superiority in a "straight-up" infantry fight.
The outcome was almost a foregone conclusion.
As the Chinese assault waves swept over Company C's
position, they began to regroup on the other side of the
hill in an attempt to surround the Americans.

Corporal

Alvin Moore recalled: "The Chinese began yelling at us in
English; 'What's the matter GI?', 'You no like me GI?', We
kill you tonight GI', and other things of that nature."11
Though several men that were in Moore's squad had "bugged
out" and ran, Moore stayed at his post firing his weapon
until "the barrel glowed red" in the darkness.12 Finally
Moore ran out of ammunition.

At almost the same time he

heard an explosion, and the machinegun on his right
(probably Bruce's gun) ceased firing.

Out of ammo, and

realizing his position was no longer tenable, Moore disabled
his machinegun so as to render it useless to the Chinese.
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Then, along with the other two remaining members of his
squad, Moore began to move down the back side of the hill.13
Meanwhile on Charlie Company's right flank, Bruce's
machinegun position had also been flanked.

Small arms fire

was raking the small depression in the ground that served as
cover for Bruce and his crew, and they began taking
casualties.

The man serving as Bruce's loader was killed,

and then another man was cut down as he tried to replace the
loader.

Realizing that the Chinese had his position

surrounded, Bruce began to think that this might be the end
of the line.

Fully aware of how North Korean's had tortured

and killed American prisoners, and with no reason to assume
the Chinese would be any different, Bruce made up his mind
to go down fighting, rather than surrender.14 Having to
serve as his own loader, Bruce reached across the shallow
depression to drag over another box of ammunition for his
machinegun.

As his hand groped through the darkness for the

ammo box, he suddenly felt an enemy hand grenade laying on
the ground.

He had never seen it come in.

Instinctively,

Bruce grasped the deadly missile, and in one motion hurled
it skyward while bringing his hands over his face.
grenade detonated in mid-air.

The

Bruce remembered a red flash,

and then everything went black.15
In a matter of minutes Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th
Infantry Regiment had been overrun and destroyed.

Elsewhere
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the rest of the 1st Battalion was being hit hard, as well as
the 3rd Battalion.

Incredibly, the 2nd Battalion of the 9th

Regiment was not engaged in battle on the night of November
25th.16 Even as its sister battalions were being destroyed,
the 2nd Battalion was hardly aware there was even a battle
going on.

The rugged terrain of Korea so channeled the

sounds of battle through the valleys

that the Chinese were

able to attack individual U.S. companies and battalions,
without being detected by nearby U.S. units.
In addition, the Chinese displayed an incredible
ability to infiltrate American positions and attack
vulnerable rear areas, especially headquarters.

Attacking

American headquarters units became a favorite and effective
tactic of the Chinese in the Battle of the Chongchon River.
Everything a frontline American infantry company needed in
the way of artillery or air support, or reinforcements, had
to be requested through battalion and regimental
headquarters.

If the lines of communication between the

headquarters and the frontline units could be cut, either by
destroying the headquarters, forcing it to displace, or
keeping it so busy defending itself that it could not
function properly, then the frontline companies would be
isolated from any support and could be chopped up piece
meal.
Serving as a jeep driver with Headquarters Company, 1st
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Battalion, 9th Infantry was PFC James D. Moran, an 18 yearold volunteer from Omaha, Nebraska.

Moran was asleep with

the other men in his company, on the floor of a small hut in
a tiny Korean village where 1st Battalion of the 9th had
established its headquarters.

Around 2200 hours, Moore and

his men were jolted awake by the sound of automatic weapons
fire in the headquarters compound.

Hurriedly dressing and

grabbing their rifles, Moran and the rest of his company
spilled out into the compound.

Moran headed for his jeep to

await his Captain, not realizing that virtually everyone
else in the headquarters, had gone to a low stone wall on
the east side of the village.
in a one-on-one firefight.

Suddenly, Moran found himself

Recalled Moran:

An enemy soldier, in civilian clothes, opened fire
from the rear on me with a "burp gun", very
inaccurate weapon, automatic fire. I dove behind
[a] haystack and he was still shooting at me into
it. I crawled to the other side. He had backed
into the moonlight shadow, but was still firing.
I sighted just below the muzzle flash, and fired,
presumably killing him as he ceased firing. As it
was then quiet, I ran to the wall where the others
were.17
The man Moran killed could have been either a North
Korean guerilla thousands of whom operated in the Eighth
Army's rear, or a Chinese infiltrator who had slipped past
friendly lines in order to attack the battalion
headquarters.18 Regardless of the man's actual identity he
and the other men in his group succeeded in severely
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disrupting 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry's headquarters, and
ensuring that its infantry companies would be without
support during the Chinese assault.
Moran soon joined up with the rest of battalion
headquarters behind the stone wall.

By this time, enemy

forces were swarming over the compound and even the wall was
no longer a safe place.
"Everyone up this hill!".

An unknown officer gave the order
There were two hills there,

however, and so half the little force went up one hill, and
half went up the other.

Moran's best friend "Rickey" called

out to him as he was half-way up one of the hills, "No Jim!
Up this hill!"

But Moran was almost to the top of his hill,

and Chinese soldiers had poured into the gap between them.
It was the last time Moran saw his friend.19
The Chinese in the valley below assaulted the hill that
Moran's friend and others had gone up.

The moon came out

from behind the clouds, illuminating the battlefield, and
Moran's little band of men watched in horror as the Chinese
massacred his friend's group on the other hill.

Moran and

the others then braced for the expected Chinese attack on
their position, but it never came.

When the battlefield

finally quieted shortly before dawn, Moran's group slipped
off their hill and headed south, reaching friendly lines a
few hours later.20
Elsewhere, the survivors of Charlie Company, 1st
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Battalion were also trying to make their escape.

Corporal

Alvin Moore had reached the back of his hill, along with the
two remaining members of his squad, expecting to find the
rest of Company C reforming there.

Instead, Moore found

only seven other men, including his company commander.

With

Chinese soldiers swarming everywhere, Moore's group found a
small gully which they climbed down into and began to move
south along.

As Moore's group worked their way through the

gully, Chinese soldiers above them were at times as close as
10-15 feet away.

But staying low, and staying quiet,

Moore's men avoided them.

Rounding a turn in the gully,

Moore and his men stumbled into a group of Korean laborers.
The U.S. Army used Korean civilians to carry food and
ammunition to frontline units on hilltops (such as Charlie
company's position) which supply trucks could not reach.

It

was just such a labor party that Moore's group had stumbled
into.21
Luckily for the Koreans, Moore's men did not shoot for
fear of attracting the Chinese still all around them.

As

Moore's men prepared to attack the South Koreans with
clubbed rifles and knives, the Korean laborers threw up
their hands, and frantically tried to communicate in broken
English who they were.

Moore remembered that:

We thought they were Chinese or North Koreans, so
we searched them down and all they had on them
were some rations and some five gallon cans of
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water. One of them could speak fairly good
English, and we told them [through this
interpreter] that we were being overrun. So they
told us how to get out of there, and so we
followed them on out, and they left us later on.
And so we came upon the [Chongchon] river [and] it
was real, real cold. I don't know how cold it
was, but it was down below zero, but it was a
running river, it wasn't frozen. The water was
running real swift so it didn't freeze solid. And
so we started wading across it, and at no time did
I get to water above my shoulders. I managed to
walk all the way across this river [and when] we
got on the other side, a massive retreat had
already started.22
Meanwhile, back at Charlie Company's original position,
PFC Robert Bruce came back to consciousness.

It was still

dark, but Bruce had no idea how long he had been out.

His

head throbbed with pain, and as he raised his hands, he saw
that the backs of them had been shredded by grenade
fragments.

Laying next to him were the dead bodies of the

other men in his machinegun squad.

Not sure if the Chinese

were still nearby or not, Bruce quietly groped around his
position looking for his Ml carbine, but it was gone, as
were the rifles of the dead men around him.

The holster for

his .45-caliber automatic pistol was also empty.

Obviously

the Chinese had stripped the bodies of their weapons and had
mistaken Bruce, covered in his own and the others blood, for
dead.

The only weapons Bruce had left were his hunting

knife and two hand grenades, which were clipped to his web
gear.23
Using his first aid pack, Bruce bandaged his hands as
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best he could, then quietly began to crawl down the hill.
Reaching the base of the hill, Bruce still saw no sign of
the Chinese until he reached a small trail about a hundred
yards away from his original position.

As he stood beside

the trail trying to determine which was the best way to go
to try and reach friendly lines, he heard oriental voices.
Bruce quickly dove behind a small group of bushes alongside
the trail.24
Laying prone on the ground, Bruce looked out from
behind his scanty cover at the moonlit trail.

A column of

Chinese soldiers were jogging up the trail towards him from
the south.

Suddenly he detected more voices, this time

coming from the north.

Turning his head, he saw another

Chinese column, this one trotting south down the trail
towards his position.

Realizing £hat the tiny bushes he was

hiding behind would not conceal him from the Chinese once
they got close, Bruce determined to make a run for it.25
Calmly pulling the pins on his two grenades, Bruce
waited till the Chinese were within range, and then hurled
one at each column.

When the grenades exploded Bruce broke

cover, ran across the trail and down a long, sloping, brush
covered embankment on the other side.

Hoarse shouts and

high-pitched screams of agony from the Chinese were soon
followed by an eruption of small arms fire as they sought to
kill their ambusher.

Bruce ran as fast as he could, with
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bullets whipping through the chill night air around him,
clipping nearby bushes and tree limbs.

The Chinese soon

directed their fire in another direction, and Bruce realized
that they had not seen him, but rather were firing blindly.
Soon he had put plenty of distance between himself and the
Chinese patrols.26
As Bruce walked on through the night, he stumbled and
fell into a small creek bed.

Cursing and regaining his

balance at the bottom, Bruce suddenly sensed someone near
him.

Spinning quickly around, Bruce saw a figure crouched

at the side of the embankment.

Bruce whipped out his large

hunting knife and leaped on the figure, driving the blade
deep into the man's chest.

To his horror, Bruce suddenly

recognized that the man was an American soldier.

Then

realizing that the man had not cried out when he stabbed
him, Bruce felt the body.

It was cold and stiff.

Examining

him closer, Bruce saw that there was a small hole in the
man's forehead, and that the back of his skull had been
blown off.27
Recoiling in fright and disgust, Bruce scrambled out of
the gully, and continued on his way.

With Chinese patrols

all around, Bruce soon determined that the only way out was
to cross the Chongchon River.

Quietly wading through icy

water that reached up to his neck at times, Bruce finally
reached the 9th Regiment's 2nd Battalion position and was
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immediately taken to an aid station.28
Many veterans of the 9th Infantry Regiment stated to me
that they remember wading across the Chongchon River
countless times during the battle, either retreating from
the Chinese at night, or counterattacking them during the
day.

One can only imagine the sort of physical trauma

endured by these men who waded through shoulder high water,
in temperatures averaging 20 degrees, chunks of ice rushing
by them, with only the swift current of the river keeping it
from freezing solid.

Finally they would emerge on the

opposite bank, clothes freezing into blocks of ice on their
bodies before they could walk a hundred paces.

The lucky

ones found warming tents and changes of clothing, the
unlucky ones suffered frostbite losing toes, feet, or legs,
and some even froze to death.

This physical hardship added

to the normal rigors of war to make the Battle of the
Chongchon River one of the most miserable that the United
States Army has ever fought.
Bruce and Moore had been forced to wade to the west
bank of the Chongchon River, because the CCF 40th Army's
attack had ruptured the center of the Second Infantry
Division's lines, and allowed the Chinese to make a serious
penetration into the division rear area.

As the Chinese

swept over the 9th Regiment, they headed straight down the
valley of the Chongchon River, attempting to assault the two
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battalions of the Second Division's artillery that were in
forward firing positions near the village of Kujang-dong.
Unknown to the Chinese, however, the 1st Battalion of the
Second Division's reserve regiment, the 23rd Infantry, had
moved into Kujang-dong shortly before nightfall.29
Colonel Paul Freeman's 23rd Infantry Regiment had been
in division reserve during the advance on November 25th.
The stiffening enemy resistance encountered by the 9th
Regiment led General Keiser to order the 23rd Regiment to
move forward and assist the 9th Regiment when the advance
was renewed at dawn on November 26th.
Captain Sherman W. Pratt was in command of Company B,
23rd Infantry Regiment, when it settled into its new
positions near Kujang-dong shortly before nightfall on
November 25th.

To the front of "Baker” Company were the

61st and 99th Field Artillery Battalions.30 In the 23rd
Regiment, everyone's mind was on the news of the resistance
encountered by the 9th Regiment at Hill 219.

Just how

serious were the Chinese about stopping the United Nations
advance to the Yalu?

In his memoirs, Pratt recalled that

his commanding officer Colonel Freeman was very concerned
about the overall situation in North Korea at that moment.
"I don't like it at all" said Freeman to Pratt.

"Last thing

I think should happen to us, is to lock horns with any
Chinese in this remote area, far forward of our supply
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sources, and so close to theirs.*'31
At approximately 182 0 hours on the night of November
25th, a force of Chinese estimated at 1200 men, waded the
icy waters of the Chongchon River and attacked the 61st
Field Artillery Battalion's position.32
The timing of this attack is important.

It occurred

approximately two hours prior to the general assault against
the Second Infantry Division, and was thus apparently
designed to deprive the division's infantry of their
artillery support when the main Chinese assault hit.
In this respect, the Chinese were successful.

Forced

to fight for their guns, the 61st Field Artillery was in no
position to offer fire support to any sector of the division
front.

The Chinese were apparently surprised by the

presence of Freeman's 23rd Infantry Regiment, as many of
them were not carrying small arms, but rather were armed
only with demolition charges with which to blow up the
artillery pieces.

Military historian S.L.A. Marshall has

theorized that Chinese scouts had observed the artillery
moving into position early in the day, and then left to
report this information, thus missing the arrival of
Freeman's 2 3rd Regiment late that afternoon.33
As hundreds of Chinese spilled into their positions,
the 61st Field Artillery fought back with small arms, fists,
and clubbed rifles.

After approximately an hour of intense
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battle, all of the officers of Battery A, 61st Field
Artillery were either killed or wounded.

At that point,

Battery A broke and fled, abandoning guns and equipment.
This panic spread to the rest of the 61st, and soon the
entire battalion was retreating in disorder back into the
23rd Infantry Regiment's lines.

As the Chinese attempted to

follow up on their success and pursue the retreating
artillerymen, they ran into the riflemen of the 1st
Battalion of the 23rd.34
As firing broke out across the 1st Battalion's front,
Captain Pratt moved through the darkness in order to try and
discern what the situation was.

Finding the position of

Company A, Pratt interrogated a young lieutenant in command
of a rifle platoon:
'Lieutenant, I'm Baker Company CO [Commanding
Officer]. Can You tell me what is going on?'
'We've got gooks out the anus [replied the
lieutenant]. They are everywhere. They've been
pouring into our area since dark. We've been
mowing them down, and still they come. They seem
to be pouring across the Chongchon River to our
left flank.' 'But there are companies over there
from the 9th Regiment' [replied Pratt]
'Are?' the
lieutenant said.
'Better say w ere! Gangs of GI
stragglers have been pouring into our positions
all evening. The stragglers are thoroughly shook
up, most are wet from wading the river and almost
frozen. They say their whole outfit has been
overrun. '35
The 23rd Infantry Regiment held against the onrushing
enemy, and soon the snowy fields in front of them were piled
high with Chinese corpses.

Later the next day, 410 Chinese
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bodies were counted

in front of the 1st Battalion, 23rd

Infantry Regiment's

line.36 Lacking the strength to break

the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the survivors of the Chinese
infiltration group retreated to the top of Hill 329.
they were joined by

Here

elements of the CCF 40th Army that had

smashed the 9th Regiment's 1st Battalion, and together these
groups became an independent force operating in the rear of
the Second Infantry Division.

Hill 329 would go down in

Second Infantry Division history as "Chinaman's Hat", so
named for its resemblance to the hat of a Chinese "coolie",
and in reference to who would own it for the remainder of
the battle.37
As the Chinese blows rained down on the Second Infantry
Division, they eventually worked their way to the east,
where Colonel George Peploe's 38th Infantry Regiment was
deployed in mountainous terrain on the right flank of the
division.

Making the 38th's position even more awkward, was

the fact that their supply route was an east-west road that
ran laterally behind their front to division supply route on
the main north-south road.

If the regiment were suddenly

forced to withdraw, they would have to first move several
miles west, before they could move south.

This fact was not

lost on the Chinese, as they opened their assault on the
38th Infantry Regiment shortly before midnight on November
25th.38
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Commanding the Tank Company of the 38th Infantry
Regiment, composed of M4A3E8 Sherman tanks, was Captain
Reginald J. Hinton.

Attaching a tank company to an infantry

regiment, was a new concept in infantry tactics.

As Hinton

explained:
You see, the way you deploy your regimental tank
company is you put [the tanks] in direct support
of the [infantry] battalions. And your control
was limited to your getting your butt around there
in a jeep and finding out what they're doing.
That's why I rode around in a jeep, instead of
assigning myself to one of the tanks.39
Unlike most others, Hinton and his tankers were a bit
more skeptical about the "Home By Christmas" talk.
First Class James Grigsby was one such tanker.

Sergeant

Grigsby's

Sherman tank was deployed just outside the small North
Korean village of Somindong on the night of November 25,
1950.

Stated Grigsby:
Somehow I had a hunch that the stuff would hit the
wind machine, so I said out of a clear sky: 'Two
men on guard in the turret tonight.' Oh, the
bitching!
(But) I says 'Them guys (Chinese)
didn't go home. They didn't knock off when it was
five o'clock. So two men in the turret.'40
Captain Hinton also was on edge that night and, rather

than going to sleep, stayed up late reading a book in his
tent.

With the bitter cold outside, Hinton was concerned

about keeping his tank crews warm, and so set up a system of
rotating the crews back to his tent to warm up a little bit
by the small stove he had set up in there.

Shortly before
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midnight, Hinton received a call on the radio from 2nd Lt.
William "Sam" Mace, one of his tank platoon commanders who
was supporting the 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment.41
Mace said that the 3rd Battalion was coming under heavy
fire, and that enemy troops were trying to rush his
position.

Hinton raced out of his tent into the cold night

air, and soon heard the sounds of battle all around him,
"bugles blowing all over the damn place."42
In Mace's tank platoon, was Sergeant J.D. Elliott who
was an assistant driver in one of the platoon's Shermans.
In combat, the assistant driver's job in a Sherman tank was
to fire the .30-caliber machinegun mounted in the right
front hull of the tank.

Elliott's tank was deployed about a

1000 yards down the road from Grigsby's tank, across from a
small embankment which sloped down to a narrow stream about
10-15 feet wide.

The Chinese attack on the 3rd Battalion

began shortly before midnight, and Elliott's tank was soon
in the thick of the battle.

Fighting from an open hatch, so

as to see better to fire his .30-caliber machinegun, Elliott
was wounded by a burst of fire from an enemy machinegun.43
The enemy bullets struck the turret behind Elliott's
head, and ricocheted into his shoulder and back.
slumped back inside the tank, severely wounded.

Elliott
While lying

on the floor of the tank Elliott saw a blinding flash, as a
bazooka rocket slammed into the Sherman on the opposite side
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of the tank from where he lay wounded.

The rocket tore

through the front of the tank, and exploded inside.

The

entire crew of the tank were wounded by shrapnel, some
severely, and the Sherman began to burn.44 Elliott's
platoon commander 2nd Lieutenant Sam Mace, who observed the
attack on Elliott's Sherman from a short distance away,
determined that the Chinese had crossed the small stream in
front of Elliott and were on the lip of the embankment when
they put the bazooka round into the tank.45
The bazooka, as most weapons of the CCF at this stage
of the Korean War, was not of Chinese manufacture.

The

Chinese Communist Forces in the Korean War were armed with a
menagerie of small arms, machineguns, and heavy weapons
which they had acquired from various sources over their
years of fighting the Chinese Nationalists, the Japanese
and, most recently, U.S. and South Korean forces.

The

bazooka that was used against Elliott's tank was in all
likelihood a U.S. 3.5-inch bazooka, captured during the
early skirmishes between U.S./ROK and Chinese forces in late
October- early November 1950.46
Just a short distance away 2nd Lieutenant Sam Mace was
in the turret of his Sherman tank, and was also fighting
from an open hatch, so as to use his turret mounted .50caliber machinegun against the onrushing waves of Chinese.
Upon arriving in Korea, Mace had the .50-caliber machinegun
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mount on his Sherman modified by Second Division engineers.
Originally designed as an anti-aircraft system for the
Sherman, the .50-caliber was set up to be fired by a person
standing on the back of the tank.

Mace's modification

allowed him to stand in the hatch of his tank and fire the
weapon himself.

In earlier battles with the North Koreans,

and now against the Chinese, Mace's modification served him
well, as he inflicted heavy damage on the attacking enemy.47
The M4A3E8 Sherman, though a World War Two era design
and in the process of being phased out as the Korean War
began, was a formidable weapon system to employ against
Chinese infantry.

Its 76-mm cannon, one .50-caliber

machinegun, and two .3 0-caliber machineguns could bring a
tremendous amount of firepower to bear on an enemy target.
The Sherman's armor stopped any small arms fire or artillery
fragments, and it would take a direct hit from a large anti
tank gun or a hit from an American bazooka in enemy hands to
destroy the tank.

Lacking heavy weapons, the Chinese

infantry resorted to close infantry assaults on the tanks in
an effort to destroy them.
On several occasions during the Battle of the Chongchon
River, Chinese infantry literally swarmed American tanks,
and destroyed them by tossing grenade bundles down one of
the hatches, or by placing an explosive charge underneath
the tank, and blowing one of its treads off, thus rendering
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the tank immobile.48 Rushing a Sherman tank would seem to
be nearly impossible but the tank had its weaknesses,
especially at night.

Sam Mace recalled:

At night you have no defense in a tank. Once you
start shooting, because you always have tracers49,
you can't see anything. You have to wait till
things die down before your night vision will come
back. It's not like today. I'd have given my
left arm for a night scope. And buckshot! We had
no canister rounds at all. I would have loved to
have had canister. Because we had to shoot HE
[high explosive] at them, and that's not very
effective. I mean you can only get, depending on
how crowded they are, 4-5 or 6-8 people at one
time with an HE round. That doesn't do the job.
You need something that will get out there about
50 yards and start spreading.
Fortunately for Mace, the Chinese bazooka team either
had only one round of ammunition for their weapon, or were
killed by the intense machinegun and small arms fire, as
they did not employ their weapon again that night.

However,

the Chinese did try another weapon against Mace's tank.

A

Chinese soldier crawled up out of the same creek bed the
bazooka team had came from, and started towards Mace's tank
carrying a bundle in his arms.

Mace spotted him right away

though, and killed him with the .50 caliber machinegun.
Later inspection of the dead Chinese soldier revealed that
his bundle was a satchel charge of TNT.51
Sergeant Elliott and the other wounded survivors of his
tank crew began limping down the road toward the battalion
aid station.

All around the little group, the battle still
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raged, and Elliott noticed many soldiers standing no more
than forty feet away from them.
our faith anyway.
easily."

"They weren't GI's, not of

We could have been taken prisoner very

But because everyone in Elliott's band was both

wounded and unarmed, the Chinese made no effort to molest
them.

One of Elliott's group, becoming panicky as they

moved past the Chinese, started to pick up a weapon from a
dead soldier lying on the road.

The others stopped him,

however, and the wounded Americans walked right past the
Chinese.

These Chinese "had already exhausted themselves,"

said Elliott, "One of them had a rifle hanging down in front
of his legs; he was standing just staring."52
As dawn broke across the icy valley of the Chongchon
River on November 2 6th, 1950, the main force of the CCF 40th
Army broke contact with the Second Infantry Division, and
faded back into the snow covered hills.

But hundreds of

Chinese infiltrators continued to move south, in an effort
to disrupt the Second Infantry Division's lines and
establish roadblocks on main U.S. supply roads.
On the morning of November 2 6th, Eighth Army
headquarters did not fully appreciate just what had happened
to the Second Infantry Division on the night of November
25th.

EUSAK G-2's summary of enemy operations for the

previous night described the Second Division's death grapple
with the CCF 40th Army with the phrase: "a series of attacks
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by enemy of unknown strength made limited gains on the right
flank.'*53 EUSAK G-2 had grounds for this estimate of the
situation.

With the exception of limited enemy attacks

against the U.S. 25th Infantry Division on the Second
Division's left, other Eighth Army units were encountering
only the expected token resistance from retreating North
Korean and Chinese forces.

EUSAK G-2 therefore decided that

the Second Infantry Division's battle was an isolated
incident, and that the ROK II Corps was also facing only
token enemy resistance.

Concluding its summary of the

developing battle, EUSAK G-2 gave its estimate of the
enemy's probable course of action as: "to conduct an active
defense in depth along present lines employing strong local
counterattack.1,54
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CHAPTER III
THE FOG OF BATTLE
"A general should say to himself many times a day:
If the hostile army were to make its appearance in
front, on my right, or on my left, what should I do?
And if he is embarrassed, his arrangements are bad;
there is something wrong; he must rectify his mistake."
Napoleon, Military Maxims of Napoleon

As dawn arrived on November 26, 1950, the commanding
general of the U.S. Second Infantry Division, Major General
Laurence Keiser, did not share EUSAK G-2's optimistic
estimate of enemy strength and intentions.

His division had

been struck across its entire front by a strong enemy force
unequivocally identified as Chinese.1
On the Second Division's left flank Colonel Charles
Sloane's 9th Infantry Regiment had been attacked by the
entire CCF 12 0th Division.

The 9th Infantry had suffered

staggering losses in the fight, been driven back 3000 yards,
and was still under heavy Chinese pressure as daylight came
on November 2 6th.2
The timely arrival of Colonel Paul Freeman's 2 3rd
Infantry Regiment had saved the Second Division's artillery
park and had the hole in the division's center caused by the
destruction of the 9th Regiment's 1st Battalion.

On the

right flank Colonel George Peploe's 38th Infantry Regiment
64
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had been hit hard by elements of the CCF 118th & 119th
Divisions, but had still managed to hold its ground.3
Exactly how many Chinese struck the Second Infantry
Division on the night of November 25th is a matter of much
debate.

Initial estimates by the Second Infantry Division's

G-2 intelligence section made on November 26th 1950, placed
enemy strength at one CCF regiment attacking the 9th, and
two CCF regiments hitting the 23rd and 38th regiments; a
total of one Chinese division.4 This estimate has for many
years been accepted as providing a fairly accurate
indication of the strength of Chinese forces during their
opening attacks against the U.S. Second Infantry Division
and has been cited in virtually every reference to the
battle in secondary works on the Korean War.5
But each of the three thoroughly detailed studies of
the Battle of the Chongchon River

differs in its estimate

of the numbers of Chinese troops who initiated the first
assaults against the Second Infantry Division.

In his book

The River and the Gauntlet, historian and military analyst
Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall states that the CCF 94th
Regiment attacked the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment on November
25, while two unidentified Chinese regiments struck the 23rd
and 38th Infantry Regiments.6 This statement by Marshall is
inaccurate because there was no CCF 94th Regiment serving in
the Chinese Communist Forces then deployed in Korea.7 In
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all fairness to Marshall, much of the information on the CCF
was still classified as "Secret" by the United States Army
when his book was published in 1953.

Nevertheless Marshall

never wrote a revised edition of The River and the Gauntlet,
and so his flawed information on the size and identity of
the Chinese force attacking the U.S. Second Infantry
Division on the night of November 25, 1950 remained intact.
In Ebb and Flow, the official United States Army
historian of this portion of the Korean War, Billy C.
Mossman, accepts the presence of three Chinese regiments.
Mossman states that two CCF regiments struck the 9th
Infantry while infiltrating elements of those two regiments
hit the Second Division artillery and 23rd Infantry, and one
CCF regiment attacked the 38th Infantry.

Although

identifying the CCF 40th Army as having faced the Second
Division, Mossman does not identify the actual regiments
that he believes made the initial attacks.8
Roy Appleman states in his ponderous work Disaster in
Korea, that "the CCF 120th Division, 40th Army, led the
Chinese Army's attack against the US 2nd Division."

Based

on Chinese prisoner interrogation reports, Appleman
identifies the CCF 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments (of
the CCF 12 0th Division) as the force that struck the U.S.
9th Infantry Regiment, and slipped past the 9th to strike
the 23rd Infantry and the 2nd Division artillery.9
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Appleman is more vague in his estimate of Chinese
strength in their attack on the 38th Infantry Regiment on
the 2nd Division's right flank.

"It is apparent", states

Appleman, "that by daylight of 26 November large numbers of
CCF from the 40th Army, and probably also from the 38th
Army, were behind Colonel Peploe's 38th Infantry east of the
Chongchon River."10
Based on an analysis of the intelligence reports filed
by the Second Infantry Division, prisoner interrogation
reports on Chinese soldiers captured in the fighting, and my
interviews with survivors of the U.S. Second Infantry
Division, I have concluded that the entire Chinese 120th
t-

Division struck the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment on the night
of November 25, 1950.

As the CCF 120th Division's attack

rolled over the 9th Regiments's 3rd and 1st Battalions, a
regimental sized detachment forded the Chongchon River, and
struck the division artillery and 23rd Infantry Regiment.
Another Chinese Division (either the CCF 118th or 119th)
attacked the 38th Infantry Regiment.11
Although my estimation of Chinese strength is triple
the size of the conventional figure used by other military
historians, it should be noted that I believe this figure to
still be a conservative estimate.

For even with my higher

estimate of enemy troop strength the CCF 40th Army, which
made the opening attack against the Second Infantry
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Division, would have still had an entire division in reserve
and unengaged.
Among the more serious losses to the 38th Infantry
Regiment in the first night of battle, was Company G, which
had seemingly disappeared.12 Sergeant Robert Hammersmith
commanded a 57-mm recoilless rifle squad in Company C of the
38th Infantry Regiment.

As the sun rose over the

battlefield on the morning of November 26th, Hammersmith
gazed through his binoculars at Company G's hilltop position
of the night before, and saw that it was "crawling" with
Chinese infantry.

"Just like a swarm of locusts" recalled

Hammersmith, "they were all over the hillside, and I
couldn't see any Americans."

Hammersmith's gun crew set up

their 57-mm recoilless rifle, and began firing into the mass
of Chinese, at 1800 to 2000 yards range.

"We were using

high explosive and white phosphorous shells" stated
Hammersmith, "just trying to inflict as many casualties as
we could."13
The Americans had better weapons than Hammersmith's
recoilless rifle with which to attack the Chinese in
daylight, and these instruments of destruction were not long
in coming.

Like avenging harpies, U.S. Air Force B-2 6

Invaders, F-51 Mustangs, and F-80 Shooting Stars swept down
on those Chinese who had not sought cover after daylight
arrived.14 The Air Force planes strafed the Chinese with
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cannons and machineguns and scourged them with fire from
thousands of gallons of napalm.

Hundreds of Chinese were

blasted apart or burned alive, and the survivors fled back
into the hills.

The War Diary of the Second Infantry

Division recorded that the airstrikes produced "excellent
results.1,15
Backed by these airstrikes, the Second Infantry
Division launched limited counterattacks of its own.
Colonel Paul Freeman formed a task force composed of four
rifle companies and a tank battalion, and launched an attack
on the Chinese infiltration force holding Hill 329, the
"Chinaman's Hat".

Backed by airstrikes and supported with

the combined firepower of the division artillery, Freeman's
task force attacked up the steep slopes of Chinaman's Hat.
Sergeant John A. Pittman commanded an infantry squad of
Company C, 23rd Infantry Regiment, and was in the lead
elements of the task force as the attack began.

In the face

of intense Chinese machinegun and mortar fire, Brown led his
squad forward.

Despite being wounded several times by

mortar shrapnel, Brown continued to advance right up to the
Chinese lines, until suddenly a grenade landed right in the
middle of his squad.

Without hesitation, Pittman flung

himself on top of the enemy grenade, absorbing the blast
with his body.

As a medical aid man reached him, Pittman's

first request was to know how many of his men had been hit.
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Pittman would survive his wounds, to become the only man in
the Battle of the Chongchon River to win his nation's
highest award; the Medal of Honor.

The Medal of Honor

citation stated:
Sergeant Pittman distinguished himself by
conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and
beyond the call of duty, in action against the
enemy. Sergeant Pittman's extraordinary heroism
reflects the highest credit upon himself, and is
in keeping with the esteemed traditions of the
military service.16
In spite of such individual acts of courage, the
Chinese held their positions.

The level of resistance that

Freeman's task force encountered revealed that the enemy
holding Chinaman's Hat was well dug-in, and had been heavily
reinforced during the pre-dawn hours of November 26th.
Against this fierce Chinese resistance, Freeman's attack
ground to a halt.

Thus a major pocket of enemy resistance

remained intact, almost two miles behind the main line of
resistance of the Second Infantry Division.17
In the 38th Infantry Regiment's sector, Lt. Colonel
Reginald Hinton commanding the 38th's Regimental Tank
Company, was still full of fight when daylight broke.
Hinton observed the former positions of the 38th Regiment's
3rd Battalion Command Post through his binoculars from a
nearby hill.

Chinese soldiers occupied the command post

area, and were milling about looting the tents and supply
trucks, as well as searching the bodies of the dead for
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anything of value.

More disturbing to Hinton, was the fact

that he could see the tents of the 3rd Battalion aid station
still standing.

The aid station had been left behind when

3rd Battalion retreated during the night, and Hinton feared
for the lives of any wounded men who may have been left
behind in the aid station tents.

Unable to contact

regimental headquarters, Hinton decided on his own
initiative to counterattack and retake the 3rd Battalion
Command Post.

Hinton recalled:

We encountered some minor resistance from what
appeared to be Chinese rear guard personnel, some
of which were engaged in looting. We also picked
up several U.S. soldiers who had become separated
from their units or had been wounded. We soon
reached the battalion command post area, and I
observed that the position had been well defended,
as evidenced by many killed and wounded [Chinese]
at the approaches to the position. I also saw
from the dead enemy soldiers, that they were well
set up. Many of the dead Chinese were armed with
Thompson sub-machineguns. We policed these up,
and later put them to good use against the Chinese
in the battle. It was later determined that the
[3rd] battalion had been forced to withdraw
southward during the night of fighting [because
of] the exposure of their right flank by the
disappearance of the 2d ROK Corps.18
The developments of the first night of battle, with the
heavy assaults against the 9th Infantry, coupled with
attacks against the U.S. 25th Infantry Division on the
Second's left, led Major General Keiser to believe that the
objective of the Chinese attack was to break through on his
left flank and separate the Second Infantry Division from
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the rest of 8th Army to the west, by penetrating down the
Chongchon River valley.19
In an attempt to foil this supposed enemy stratagem,
Keiser took steps to bolster the heavily damaged 9th
Infantry Regiment holding his left flank.

Two infantry

battalions from the 23rd Infantry Regiment were moved into
position on the 9th Infantry's right flank astride the
Chongchon River.20 In addition the 2nd Engineer Combat
Battalion was ordered to join the 9th Regiment and go into
the line as infantry.21 Commanding a platoon of engineers
in the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion was Lieutenant James
Malone and he recalled:
My platoon was working on the road that served as
the MSR [main supply route] for the division, when
we got a message about 1400 hours to return to the
company area and reorganize as infantry. No one
briefed us on the situation, but the mere fact
that we engineers were being committed as infantry
communicated to the last pioneer soldier that the
situation was in itself desperate.22
Keiser also reorganized the Second Infantry Division's
artillery battalions.

The 61st and 99th Field Artillery

were returned to the U.S. First Cavalry Division on orders
from 8th Army.

This move was ordered by 8th Army commander

Lieutenant General Walton Walker to bring the First Cavalry
Division, then in 8th Army reserve, up to full strength
preparatory to its being committed to the battle now
developing along the Chongchon River.23 Reiser's remaining
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artillery battalions were organized as follows:
15th

Field Artillery - Direct Support 23rd Infantry Regiment

37th

Field Artillery - Direct Support 9th Infantry Regiment

38th

Field Artillery - Attached 38th Infantry Regiment

503rd Field Artillery - General Support
17th Field Artillery - General Support24
As these moves were being carried out, the Second
Infantry Division encountered resistance from hundreds of
Chinese infiltrators operating both in and behind the
division's positions,25 These infiltrators set up
roadblocks, and harassed American units as they attempted to
move into position.

The rugged terrain of the Chongchon

battlefield, made cross country movement by American
vehicles impossible.
All tanks, trucks, and jeeps, along with any equipment
(such as artillery) that they might be towing, had to use
the primitive road network of the area for movement.
Chinese infantry, unencumbered by heavy equipment or
vehicles, moved nimbly and quickly over the rugged hills and
steep valleys that were impassable to United States forces.
Although American units, with their plethora of vehicles,
were theoretically much more mobile than Chinese forces, in
reality the rough terrain and poor road network of the
battlefield actually gave the advantage to the CCF.
Realizing the importance of the road network to the
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American forces, the Chinese began establishing roadblocks
behind American lines with their infiltrators.

These

roadblocks were often merely some logs and large rocks that
were laid in the road, and were usually lightly defended as
they were manned only by small infiltration groups.

But the

roadblocks proved to be a source of constant harassment for
the Second Infantry Division during the Battle of the
Chongchon River, and were a harbinger of the disaster which
was to come.
By the morning of November 26th, only the 2nd Battalion
of Colonel Charles Sloane's 9th Infantry Regiment remained
intact.

The 9th Regiment's 1st and 3rd Battalions had been

decimated, and only scattered individuals and platoons
remained of them.26 Sloane was ordered to reform his
regiment into defensive positions, and prepare for a renewed
Chinese attack that night.
As the 9th Regiment made its preparations, Major
Cesides Barberis, commanding the 9th Regiment's 2nd
Battalion, became concerned over the large numbers of
wounded men from the 1st and 3rd Battalions that had
accumulated in his aid station.

Fearing for the safety of

these wounded men should the Chinese renew their offensive,
and needing his battalion aid station to be clear to handle
any new casualties that would result from the Chinese
attack, Barberis gave the order to evacuate as many of the
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wounded men as possible to safety.

As his men began

preparing to withdraw the wounded, Barberis learned that
infiltrating Chinese had established a roadblock along the
only road leading south out of the 9th Regiment's positions.
Corporal James L. Brown of Company E, 2nd Battalion, 9th
Infantry Regiment was placed in charge of the casualties
with orders to break through the enemy roadblock and get the
wounded men to safety.27
Moving south along the road in a truck convoy, Brown
soon discovered the enemy roadblock.

Approximately fifteen

to twenty Chinese were established in a culvert which
crossed under train tracks on the left side of the road.
Sizing up the situation, Brown had the "walking wounded" in
his column place suppressing fire on the Chinese, while he
took two men and commandeered an abandoned railroad hand
car.28
Pushing the hand car in front of themselves for cover
Brown and his two men ran down the train tracks towards the
Chinese position, firing their rifles as they came.

The

Chinese met Brown with small arms fire and grenades.
Undeterred, Brown and his two comrades ran right into the
Chinese manning the roadblock.

As his rifle ran out of

ammunition Brown did not pause to reload, but instead leaped
into the remaining Chinese, clubbing them to death with his
rifle.

Brown's intrepid action cleared the road, and
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allowed the wounded men to be withdrawn to safety.

For this

action, Corporal James L. Brown received the Distinguished
Service Cross, the United States Army's second highest award
for bravery in battle.29
As the Second Infantry Division shifted into defensive
positions, disturbing news reached General Reiser's
headquarters.

Large numbers of South Korean soldiers were

arriving in the 38th Infantry Regiment's sector.
Interrogation of the South Koreans revealed that they were
from the ROK 3rd Infantry Regiment, and that the entire ROK
II Corps had collapsed and was in full retreat on the Second
Division's right flank!30
The ROK II Corps, composed of the ROK 6th, 7th, and 8th
Divisions, was on the right flank of the Second Infantry
Division, and had reported on the 24th and 25th of November
that they were meeting stiff enemy resistance to their
advance up the spine of the rugged Myomyang Mountain
range.31 On the night of November 25, and during the early
morning hours of November 26, 1950, the ROK II Corps was
struck with a massive attack by the CCF 38th and 42nd Armies
which smashed open the front of the South Koreans.

Major

General Yu Hae Ueng, commanding general of the ROK II Corps,
moved swiftly in an attempt to seal the breach in his lines.
But as Yu attempted to move up his reserves through the
mountainous terrain, he found the roads blocked by Chinese
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infiltrators and North Korean guerrillas.

Outnumbered,

outmaneuvered, and outfought, the front of the ROK II Corps
collapsed, as the survivors of the ROK 8th and 7th Divisions
dissolved into a panic stricken mob fleeing south.

Only the

ROK 3rd Regiment, which had been missed by the main Chinese
attack, and the understrength ROK 6th Division some 25 miles
to the rear in ROK II Corps reserve, survived the initial
Chinese assault.32
Both during and after the Korean War, American soldiers
severely criticized the fighting abilities of their South
Korean ally.

This American belief that the South Koreans

were poor soldiers was shared not only by other United
Nations forces, but by the Communist enemy as well.

From

their initial intervention to their final offensives of the
Korean War, the Chinese Communist Forces routinely made the
South Koreans the target of their initial assault, in order
to better their chances at achieving a breach in the United
Nations front.

The failures of the South Korean soldiery

were in large part due to inadequacies in training and
equipment, rather than any lack of courage on the part of
the South Koreans.
The small standing army of 98,000 men that South Korea
possessed at the beginning of the Korean War on June 25,
1950, was decimated in the early stages of the fighting.33
Whole divisions had to be rebuilt with raw recruits
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conscripted from the rice fields and city streets of South
Korea.

These South Korean draftees were officially given

only ten days of training, and many times less, before being
hurled into the inferno of battle.34 In contrast, American
soldiers received 12 weeks of basic training followed by
advanced training once they were assigned to a unit.35
North Korean and Chinese soldiers received an average of six
to eight weeks of instruction before being committed to the
front.36
In addition to the lack of training, equipment
shortages also plagued the ROK army.

South Korean divisions

possessed only a fraction of the normal complement of
machineguns and mortars assigned to a United States
division, and their artillery support was limited to a
single battalion of 105-mm howitzers.

Even in terms of

numbers, a South Korean division contained only 60 percent
of the strength of a United States Army division; although
in numbers alone this was also the approximate strength of
Chinese and North Korean divisions.37
The ROK II Corps provides an excellent example of the
deficiencies found in the South Korean army.

Of the three

divisions (6th, 7th & 8th) composing the ROK II Corps at the
Battle of the Chongchon River, only the 8th Division was at
full strength.

The ROK 7th Division had almost been

destroyed in the summer battles with the North Koreans, and
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was completely rebuilt with half-trained draftees.

The ROK

6th Division had suffered heavy casualties in battles with
the Chinese forces near Unsan, North Korea just three weeks
earlier, and had received virtually no replacements for its
lost men and equipment.38
Against the undermanned and underequipped ROK II Corps
the Chinese hurled two veteran armies (CCF 38th and CCF
42nd), each over 30,000 men strong, and coordinated this
assault with North Korean guerrilla attacks in the South
Koreans rear area.

By noon of November 26th the ROK II

Corps had collapsed, its survivors streaming southward and
still under attack by pursuing Chinese forces.

The right

flank of the Second Infantry Division had now become the
right flank of the whole Eighth Army, and was in serious
danger of being turned.39
In Eighth Army Headquarters, the collapse of the ROK II
Corps was still treated as a "local enemy counterattack".
The Second Infantry Division's report of the arrival of the
ROK 3rd Regiment in its lines alerted Eighth Army
headquarters to the fact that the ROKs were retreating, but
just how serious their defeat had been was still not
appreciated by Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General
Walton Walker on November 26th.40
Colonel George Peploe, commanding the Second Division's
38th Infantry Regiment, also was not certain of the

80

situation he faced either.

If what Peploe had learned from

the surviving ROK 3rd Regiment was true, then there was
nothing on his right flank but retreating South Koreans and
unknown numbers of Chinese.

Peploe's 38th Infantry Regiment

held the right flank of the Second Infantry Division, and
the Second Infantry Division had now become the right flank
of the entire Eighth Army.

Reacting to this situation,

Peploe attached the remnants of the ROK 3rd Regiment to his
command, and then bent the lines of his 3rd Battalion to the
south, so as to refuse his right flank to any enemy
threat.41
Peploe was concerned about the fate of his Company G as
well, because they had not been heard from since the first
night of the battle.

Worried that there might be survivors

of Company G trapped behind Chinese lines, and determined to
maintain his hold on the narrow supply road to his rear,
Peploe ordered Company C of the 38th to go out and retake
"George" Company's lost position.42 Sergeant Robert
Hammersmith, commanding a recoilless rifle squad in Company
C recalled:
Our company commander, Captain Taylor, got orders
from regiment to go out and help George Company.
And I remember Captain Taylor told the Colonel
[Peploe] that it was suicide, because we could see
them [the Chinese] out there in front of us. And
the Colonel said 'Those are your orders.'43
Just before dusk on the night of November 2 6th,
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Hammersmith and the rest of Charlie Company of the 38th
Infantry Regiment, dropped their backpacks and extra gear so
as to travel as light as possible, and headed towards
Company G's former position 2000 yards to their front.
Moving over the rugged hills, Charlie Company was able to
cover only a few hundred yards before darkness once more
covered the battlefield.

A feeling of uneasiness crept over

the men as they struggled over the broken ground, shivering
as the temperature steadily dropped, and a light snow began
to fall.

No one in Charlie Company was certain just what

was waiting for them in the gathering darkness but, whatever
it was, it had destroyed George Company, and they were
heading right for it.44
"Americans, you surrender we no kill!"

The heavily

accented words startled Hammersmith and the rest of Charlie
Company.

Men dove for cover, as the sound of rifles being

locked and loaded clattered along Charlie Company's column.
After going only 800 yards, Company C had walked right into
an enemy trap.

Again the oriental voice called out

"Americans, you surrender we no kill!"

Recovering from

their initial shock, the Americans shouted back profanity
into the darkness.

"When that happened, they (the Chinese)

just opened up" recalled Hammersmith, "They just started
.1

raking the valley with machinegun fire."45
Realizing now that he had walked into an ambush,
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Captain Taylor maneuvered his company so as to seize the
high ground.

Leaving the 3rd Platoon as a base of fire to

cover the move, Taylor attacked the hill on his left flank
with his remaining three platoons.

Tracers from the

a

encircling Chinese machineguns crisscrossed the slopes of
the hill, but the suddenness of the American attack confused
the Chinese, and Charlie Company soon seized the top of the
hill.46
Hammersmith's recoilless rifle gunner was wounded in
the ambush.

Consequently, Hammersmith found himself

carrying his own weapon plus the 47 pound 57-mm recoilless
rifle up the hillside.

Struggling with his heavy load,

Hammersmith fell behind the attacking platoons.
Hammersmith:
I felt someone's shoulder hit me in the butt as I
was climbing this hill. Well at this time it was
dark and I didn't know who the hell it was, but I
just felt somebody's shoulder hit me right in the
butt and started pushing me up the hill. So I
said 'Come on let's go!' When we got to the top
of the hill, I turned around and looked, and it
was a Chinese man!47
A group of three Chinese had followed the Americans up
the hillside, not to fight them but rather to surrender to
them.

The Chinese were apparently unarmed, and the

Americans quickly tied their hands and feet and placed a
guard on them.

Captain Taylor rapidly formed Charlie

Company into a defensive perimeter along the crest of the
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hill, and laid down suppressing fire to cover the withdrawal
of his 3rd Platoon from their covering position in the
valley, up the hillside to join the rest of the company.48
Charlie Company had escaped the initial Chinese ambush,
but now found themselves cut off from their battalion by
large numbers of Chinese who they could see as flickering
black shadows, swarming on the ridges and in the valleys
around them.

The blaring of bugles, and the answering calls

from whistles and gongs, revealed to them that large numbers
of Chinese were readying for an attack on the 38th Infantry
Regiment.

Captain Taylor tried to reach regimental

headquarters by radio, both to warn headquarters of the
impending Chinese attack and to request help.

But all

attempts failed, as the rugged countryside of Korea blocked
the radio transmission.

Taylor then ordered runners to be

sent out to try and slip past the encircling Chinese, and
reach the 38th Regiment's lines.

But as the hours went by,

the runners did not return, and the Chinese attack was now
beginning in full force against the 38th Infantry
Regiment.49
Help suddenly came to the men of Charlie Company from
an unexpected source.

One of the Chinese prisoners spoke

excellent English, and he told his besieged captors that he
knew a way through the Chinese positions.

According to

Hammersmith, Taylor at first rejected the offer out of hand.

But with the failure of the runners, and knowing that at any
moment the Chinese might decide to eliminate the cut-off
Americans, Taylor gave his approval.

Sergeant Hammersmith

and the others loosed the bonds on the Chinese prisoners,
and warned them of just what they would do to them if this
was a trick.

As his recoilless rifle was now out of

ammunition, and not wanting to be slowed by its weight,
Hammersmith disassembled the weapon in the darkness, and
"scattered the parts to the four winds".

Then he and the

rest of Charlie Company moved out, following the lead of
their Chinese prisoner.

Learning a lesson in infiltration

from their Chinese captive, Charlie Company succeeded in
slipping past the encircling Chinese, and at first light on
November 27th, reached their original positions from where
they had set out early on the previous evening.50
Reaching friendly positions, Taylor's half-frozen men
eagerly headed for a fire that had just been started in the
company area.

Their Chinese prisoners moved over by the

fire as well, and as they warmed themselves the Chinese
removed their bulky, padded jackets.

When the Chinese

removed their jackets, the Americans were shocked to see
that all three Chinese had loaded Thompson sub-machineguns
strapped to their backs!

In the darkness and excitement, no

one had thought to actually search the Chinese prisoners,
who had appeared to be unarmed.

As hoarse shouts of
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profanity rang out, the Americans quickly knocked the
Chinese to the ground and stripped them of their weapons.
In spite of the commotion they caused, the Chinese had shown
no interest in using their weapons, and seemed "happy to be
out of the war."

Recalled Hammersmith: "If they (the

Chinese prisoners) had wanted to, they could have killed
everybody there, especially when we were trying to slip past
their buddies."51
Hammersmith later had a chance to talk to the Chinese
prisoner who spoke English.

According to Hammersmith, the

Chinese prisoner had graduated from UCLA, and then returned
to China to try and bring the rest of his family to the
United States.

While in China, a Chinese Communist unit

came through his village looking for "volunteers" for their
army.

"Well, they call it 'volunteering'" stated the

Chinese prisoner to Hammersmith, "when they come through
your village and say 'Either you join us or we kill you and
your family'.1,52
Peploe's company-sized probe of the Chinese lines to
his front was a bold move, considering the size of the
Chinese force confronting the 38th Infantry Regiment on the
night of November 26, 1950.

Peploe was unaware of the

actual strength of the Chinese force in his sector, and
perhaps Charlie Company's true mission had been to ascertain
just how many Chinese the 38th Regiment was facing.

Unknown
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to Peploe, elements of two Chinese Armies (40th, and 38th)
were at that time to his north and northeast.

A third

Chinese army (42nd) was sweeping southwest through the gap
on his right flank where the ROK II Corps had been,
attempting to come in behind Peploe's regiment and the rest
of the Second Infantry Division.53
As stated earlier Major General Keiser, commanding
general of the Second Infantry Division, was convinced by
the previous night's fighting that the main enemy attack was
aimed at his left flank and center, down the Chongchon River
valley.

Keiser's maneuvers of November 26th had been

designed to bolster that section of his front, while he left
the hard pressed 38th Infantry Regiment to fend for itself
on the right.54
One of Keiser's maneuvers had been to assign the 2nd
Engineer Combat Battalion as infantry to the 9th Regiment.
Colonel Charles Sloane's 9th Infantry Regiment had suffered
heavy losses on the night of November 25th, and essentially
only Major Barberis' 2nd Battalion was still intact when
night fell on November 26th.

Sergeant Harry Lohmeyer was

manning a .50 caliber machinegun with the 2nd Engineers when
they took up positions on a small hill, just west of the ice
choked Chongchon River, on the night of November 2 6th.
were to backup the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry
Regiment" recalled Lohmeyer.55

"We
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In spite of the reinforcements Keiser had sent them,
the heavy casualties that the 9th Infantry had suffered in
the previous night's battle left them in no shape for
another major fight.

But as bugles bleated through the

frigid night air, and Chinese signal rockets went up along
their lines, the men of the 9th Infantry realized that their
battle was far from over.

Once more the Chinese 40th Army

rose to the attack, and once again the battered 9th Infantry
Regiment was their main target.56
The remnants of the 9th Infantry Regiment, as well as
the two battalions from the 23rd Infantry Regiment which had
been brought up to reinforce the 9th's right flank, were
soon under heavy attack.

The Chinese attack was more subtle

this time, as they probed for weakness in the 9th Infantry's
defensive positions.

The Chinese soon found their weakspot,

the battered survivors of the 9th Infantry's 3rd Battalion.
Colonel Charles Sloane, commanding the 9th Infantry,
knew that the decimated 3rd Battalion's position was the
weak link in his defensive position, which is why he had
deployed the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion as a "backstop"
to this unit.

Even with this added support, the 3rd

Battalion was still hurting from the heavy losses it had
sustained the previous night.

Once the Chinese ascertained

where the American line was weakest, they massed their units
opposite this point and attacked in great strength,
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supported by mortar and machinegun fire.

The Chinese rained

blows down on the 3rd Battalion and under the intense enemy
pressure, the battered battalion began falling back.
From their reserve position, the 2nd Engineers had been
spectators to the opening rounds of the Chinese attack.
However, at approximately 2345 hours on November 26th, the
2nd Engineers were informed via radio that the remnants of
the 9th Infantry Regiment's 3rd Battalion would be
withdrawing through their lines.

With this in mind, the 2nd

Engineers were not too concerned when from out of the
darkness appeared a large formation of soldiers, walking
towards the Engineer's lines with slung weapons.

Without a

sound, the soldiers moved like phantoms across the silvery
snow, until they were only twenty yards from Sergeant
Lohmeyer's .50-caliber machinegun position.

Suddenly

Corporal Lark, manning a .30-caliber machinegun some fifteen
yards to Lohmeyer's left, screamed "Americans my ass!" and
cut loose with his machinegun on the enemy column.

"All

hell broke loose then" recalled Lohmeyer, "and before we
knew it we and the Chinese were engaged in some real heavy
fighting" .57
As the fight was joined, the initial Chinese force was
soon heavily reinforced as, to the blare of bugles and
banging of gongs, large waves of Chinese attacked the 2nd
Engineers across the nightmarish, blue-black landscape of
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the battlefield.

Recalled Lohmeyer:

As during previous engagements, I [was] having
trouble maintaining the realization that I was in
a major life threatening situation. My mind kept
putting me in a position of removal from the
action. I can still remember feeling like a
spectator viewing a war movie.58
Chinese concussion grenades began landing all around
Lohmeyer's gun position, and his assistant gunner was felled
by Chinese small arms fire.

Lohmeyer, an experienced

engineer, had dug a good fighting position for his .50caliber machinegun, and it protected him from the enemy
fire.

Within the shelter of this position Lohmeyer

inflicted heavy casualties with his machinegun on the
attacking Chinese infantry.

Then suddenly a concussion

grenade landed right in his position, "blowing my boot
apart, leaving my leg. numb, and my head feeling like a used
accordion.1,59
Dazed by the blow, Lohmeyer nevertheless continued to
fire his weapon at the onrushing Chinese.

But the large

Chinese assault waves merely flowed around and past
Lohmeyer, sweeping over the hill.

The dead were soon piled

high in front of the 2nd Engineers' position, but onward the
Chinese came, seemingly heedless of their own losses.

The

Chinese assault waves that had swept past the engineers'
hilltop position, reformed on the other side of the hill,
and began attacking the engineers from the rear.

In danger
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of being surrounded and completely destroyed, the 2nd
Engineers began to fall back.
"With their continuous frontal attacks and massive
numbers" recalled Lohmeyer, "they finally overran our
position, and kicked us off of the hill, with heavy losses
to their side."

Ordered to withdraw by his commanding

officer, Lohmeyer took out the two sections of his
machinegun's bolt (thus disabling the weapon) and began
retreating down the hillside, heading towards the Chongchon
River.60
Major Barberis' 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry
Regiment had not been engaged on the first night of battle,
and now he again found his battalion unengaged.

While the

battle raged all around it, the 2nd Battalion received
orders from their regimental commander Colonel Charles
Sloane to cross to the east side of the Chongchon River, and
reinforce the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment,
which was holding the right flank of the 9th Infantry
Regiment on the east bank of the Chongchon River.

The enemy

forces holding the "Chinaman's Hat" had attacked down its
icy slopes shortly after darkness, and were driving the 23rd
Regiment back down the valley of the Chongchon.

Determined

not to once again miss the battle, Barberis readied his
battalion to cross the Chongchon and reinforce the
beleaguered 23rd Regiment.

As Barberis' battalion prepared
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to move, however, they were suddenly hit by a full-scale
Chinese assault.

Caught off balance, the 2nd Battalion was

sent reeling back towafds the icy waters of the Chongchon.
In the 2nd Battalion's aid station on the night of
November 26th was PFC Robert Bruce, one of the survivors of
the 9th Infantry's 1st Battalion, who had been wounded and
suffered a concussion in the previous night's fighting.

As

the sounds of battle grew to a roar outside the aid station,
Bruce feared that the 2nd Battalion was going to be overrun.
An American officer suddenly burst into the tent and said
the battalion was withdrawing, and asked if there were any
wounded men there who could still fight.
other "walking wounded" volunteered.

Bruce and several

Bruce explained that

he was not trying to be a hero by volunteering, just trying
to survive.

The 1st Battalion's Aid Station had been

overrun the night before, and the wounded men there
massacred by the Chinese.

Bruce was not sure which way the

battle was going, but if they were asking for walking
wounded to join the fight, then he knew the situation must
be getting desperate.

Deciding he had a better chance

fighting than laying in the hospital tent, Bruce and the
other volunteers were handed rifles and ammunition and sent
out into the darkness to join the battle.61
Bruce and the others did not have to go very far
because the Chinese assault waves were already lapping at
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the 2nd Battalion's Command Post and Aid Station area.

As

tracers from the machineguns of both sides crisscrossed
through the darkness, the sounds of battle reached Bruce's
ears.

The long "brrrrrp" of the Chinese sub-machineguns,

the crack of American and Chinese rifles, and the muffled
explosions from hand grenades filled the frigid night air.
American artillery was also at work, pounding away at the
back of the Chinese formations, and then working their fire
ever closer to the American lines, until the big shells were
dropping a scant fifty yards in front of the 2nd Battalion's
positions.62
But many Chinese had already penetrated to within a few
feet of the 2nd Battalion and, to the blare of bugles, they
rose as one and rushed the Americans.

Bruce and the other

walking wounded were moving towards a low earthen embankment
when the Chinese made their rush.

Bruce opened fire with

his rifle, dropping several of the Chinese attackers.

But

then the metallic "ping" of his empty Ml clip ejecting
itself signaled his need to reload.

By that time the

Chinese were only a few feet away, and so Bruce turned his
Ml and swung it as a club at the nearest Chinese, striking
the enemy soldier full in the face with the steel butt-plate
of the rifle.

After that, a wild melee ensued as the fight

became hand-to-hand.

Swinging his clubbed rifle, Bruce

felled several more Chinese then broke free of the melee to
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join the main body of the 2nd Battalion which was now
withdrawing east across the Chongchon River.

Once again,

Bruce plunged into the icy waters of the Chongchon River, as
he and the rest of the men with the 2nd Battalion (including
survivors of the 1st & 3rd battalions) waded across to join
in a defensive position with the 23rd Infantry Regiment.63
Colonel Paul Freeman's 23rd Infantry Regiment had come
under heavy attack at approximately 203 0 hours on November
26th, just prior to the Chinese assault on the 9th Infantry
Regiment.

Holding the Second Infantry Division's center,

the 23rd Regiment's lines were assailed by large numbers of
Chinese, attacking in at least division strength.

Again the

Chinese showed their uncanny ability to infiltrate past
American frontline units, as a Chinese infiltration team
slipped past the 23rd Regiment's 1st Battalion and attacked
Freeman's regimental command post itself.

Surprised to find

such large numbers of enemy in their rear area, the lightly
armed headquarters staff fought back as best they could, but
were soon forced to retreat.
In his haste to withdraw, Colonel Freeman left his code
books and other classified information in his tent.

Upon

reaching his 1st Battalion's Command Post, Freeman regrouped
and led a counter-attack in an attempt to retake his
regimental headquarters, and recover the lost code books.
Freeman's attack was soon halted by intense Chinese
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machinegun and mortar fire, and it became apparent that the
Chinese now held the former positions of the 2 3rd Regimental
Command Post in great strength.

The battle turned into a

long range firefight, with the Americans gradually achieving
the upper hand.64
The remnants of the 9th Infantry Regiment, meanwhile,
regrouped on the east bank of the Chongchon River, and held
their ground, inflicting heavy loss on the Chinese
attackers.

Shortly after daybreak, Freeman again attacked

up the valley of the Chongchon and this time succeeded in
recovering his regimental command post at 0845 hours on the
morning of November 27th.

Luckily, Freeman found his tent

undisturbed, and his code books and maps safe.65 The 9th
Infantry Regiment, gravely weakened though it was, followed
up Freeman's success by attacking back across the Chongchon
and retaking its lost position as well.

Thus, although the

Chinese attacks on November 26th had inflicted heavy
casualties on the 9th and 2 3rd Infantry Regiments, their
gains in territory proved to be only temporary.

Having

recovered from their initial shock and surprise at the
strength of the Chinese force confronting them, the Second
Infantry Division was beginning to strike back at its
tormentor.
The casualties were mounting in the Second Infantry
Division, however, and if the battle became one of attrition
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the Second had no hope against the overwhelming number of
enemy forces opposing it.
Major General Keiser was not yet completely aware of
the insurmountable pressure now beginning to build up on the
Second Infantry Division's right flank, as thousands of
Chinese poured through the gaping hole left by the
retreating ROK II Corps.

With Reiser's attention fixed on

the frontal assault of the first two night's of the battle
by the CCF 40th Army down the Chongchon River valley, he was
slow to realize the fact that the main enemy effort was
actually being directed against his right flank.

Against

this exposed flank the CCF 42nd and 38th Armies (app. 60,000
men), having defeated the ROK II Corps, were now maneuvering
to encircle and destroy not only the U.S. Second Infantry
Division, but the entire Eighth United States Army in Korea.
Only the battered U.S. Second Infantry Division now stood in
the path of the onrushing Chinese.

If the Chinese could get

past the Second Division, they would be able to come in
behind the Eighth Army and completely surround it.
Although Major General Keiser was still unaware of the
overall Chinese plan, he did at least appreciate that the
Chinese had now entered the Korean War in force and were
launching a major offensive.66 Eighth Army Intelligence was
only dimly aware of either of these facts, and highly
skeptical of the grave danger that now faced the entire
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army.

In its discussion of enemy capabilities and probable

course of action for the period ending at 2400 hours on
November 26th, EUSAK G-2 wrote:
Friendly unit withdrawals from north and northeast
of Tokchon indicate a determined enemy effort in
that area, however, [enemy] unit identification
and strength estimates are not presently
available. It should be considered possible that
a determined enemy drive may be made in this area,
especially considering the apparent exploitation
opportunity after the limited withdrawal of
friendly units on the east flank. However, with
the possible exception of the relatively vague
situation on the east flank, the enemy reaction to
the EUSAK attack lias been one of active defense
with local counterattacks in strength. This last
is believed as the likely course of action.67
After two full nights of battle, the U.S. Second
Infantry Division had been knocked back on its heels and the
ROK II Corps had ceased to exist as a cohesive fighting
unit.

Yet despite this evidence that a major offensive by

the Chinese army was underway, EUSAK G-2 still referred to
the massive Chinese assault as a "local counterattack."
Through the fog of battle the Dragon was striking, and
its victim could not even determine from where the blows
came.

Over two thousand years before the Korean War, the

Chinese military philosopher Sun Tze wrote: "0 divine art of
subtlety and secrecy!

Through you we learn to be invisible,

through you inaudible; and hence hold the enemy's fate in
our hands."68
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CHAPTER IV
RIGHT FLANK AND REARGUARD
Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
They stood, and earth's foundations stay;
What God abandoned, these defended,
And saved the sum of things for pay.
Alfred Housman, "Epitaph on an Army of Mercenaries11

At dawn on November 27, 1950, the first rays of
sunlight glinted off of the snow which covered the
battlefield of the Chongchon River valley.

The pristine

beauty of the scene was horribly tainted by the twisted
corpses of Chinese and American soldiers, which lay strewn
in great heaps along the hillsides and valley floor.

The

lines of the U.S. Second Infantry Division had been bent but
not broken, despite its two days and two nights of fierce
battle against a numerically superior foe.1
In the center of the Second Division's line, the 23rd
Infantry Regiment had with comparative ease retaken its
ground lost on November 26th.

The 23rd Regiment had mainly

been fighting Chinese infiltrators who continued to grow in
strength and attacked off of Hill 329, the "Chinaman's
Hat."2 The Chinese had directed their main assaults at both
flanks of the Second Infantry Division and were succeeding
in slowly driving them in.

The 9th Infantry Regiment held

the left flank of the Second Division, and despite having
suffered the heaviest losses of any of the division's
102
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regiments, counterattacked across the Chongchon River at
first light and retook much of the ground it had
relinquished the night before.3
On the right flank the 38th Infantry Regiment was
living up to its nickname "The Rock of the Marne," and was
holding its ground against fierce Chinese assaults.

The

Chinese attack on the 38 th Infantry Regiment continued into
the daylight hours of the 27th, as large numbers of Chinese,
in at least division strength, pressed their assault.4
As dawn broke, outposts of the 38th Regiment reported
seeing a column of approximately 800 Chinese trotting
straight towards the regimental command post. Simultaneously
a large firefight erupted behind the command post, where the
503rd Field Artillery was fighting for its guns as Chinese
soldiers in a different column spilled into its positions.5
The headquarters staff of the 38th Infantry Regiment
grabbed their weapons, and the I&R (Intelligence and
Reconnaissance) Platoon of the headquarters formed a
skirmish line behind the dike of a frozen rice paddy next to
the command post.

Captain Reginald Hinton had just pulled

up in his jeep to report to headquarters on the night's
fighting, when he saw the I&R Platoon formed up in the rice
paddy.

He grabbed his carbine and quickly joined the

headquarters staff.6
As eyes peered into the half-light of dawn, a strange
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noise came to everyone's ears.

Recalled regimental

operations officer Major Warren G. Hodges:
We heard this "pitty-pat" coming down through the
snow, and here's this big black sergeant in his
long-johns, with one boot on, coming down through
the snow pitty-patting, and he says "Don't shoot!
I's an American and there's more coming."7
This sergeant came from the 503rd Field Artillery, many
of whose men remained in position.

These men, after having

finally beaten back the Chinese force that had entered their
gun pits, saw the lead elements of the previously sighted
Chinese column come up through a draw, and head straight at
them and the 38th's regimental command post.

But the 155-mm

guns of the 503rd were pointed in the opposite direction, as
they had been shelling the Chinese that had flanked the
command post.

With the other Chinese column only a few

hundred yards away, there seemed to be no way that the guns
could be traversed in time.

Then both Hodges and Hinton

witnessed an incredible event.

Recalled Hodges:

We were amazed. There was one sergeant and one of
his cannoneers that switched trails on a 155, that
is they swung the piece around. It will only
traverse so far right and left, and they needed to
get it around further so they picked the trails up
and swung it around. It's physically impossible
for two people to do it, but I guess their
adrenaline was running so high. They switched it
around and fired point blank up the draw where the
Chinese were coming out, it was just like shooting
a rifle. Just splattered them [Chinese] all over
the country, and pretty much cleaned that group of
inf i1trators out.8
The Chinese succeeded in penetrating the 38th
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Regiment's position to the point where they appeared likely
to sever the narrow dirt track which served as the
regiment's only supply road.

In a desperate attempt to

maintain control over his supply road, Colonel George Peploe
ordered his 38th Infantry Regiment to retake certain key
roadside hills that had been lost in the previous night's
fighting.9
Corporal Robert K. Imrie, amachinegunner in

Company F,

38th Infantry Regiment, provided support fire for his
platoon as it advanced back up the hill they had lost the
night before.

Suddenly two Chinese machineguns, one on the

left and one on the right, delivered a deadly cross-fire on
the attacking Americans.

Several men were hit, and the rest

of the platoon dove onto the ground.

As the Chinese

machineguns raked the ground with their fire, it became
apparent to Corporal Imrie that the entire platoon was in
danger of being destroyed.

Imrie stood up from his

position, cradled his .30 caliber machinegun in his arms and
charged directly at the Chinese machinegun on the right
flank, firing as he ran.10
Imrie's personal duel with the Chinese gun crew ended
when he succeeded in killing all of them with his fire,
whereupon the Chinese machingun crew on the opposite flank
mortally wounded him with a burst of bullets.

Imrie's

platoon soon avenged him as, inspired by Imrie's bravery,
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they silenced this remaining Chinese machinegun, and secured
the hill.

For his valor Imrie was posthumously awarded the

Distinguished Service Cross.11
As the commander of the Second Infantry Division, Major
General Laurence Keiser, surveyed the scene of battle he
realized that after haying fought against overwhelming odds
for two days and two nights, his division could not continue
to trade men with the Chinese army.

With its right flank in

mid-air, and heavy Chinese attacks continually striking its
left flank, the Second Infantry Division's lines were being
bent back onto each other in the shape of a horseshoe.
As reports of the fighting on the night of November
26/27 1950, began to filter into Eighth Army Headquarters on
the morning of November 27th, Lieutenant General Walton
Walker at last began to realize the immense danger his right
flank was in.

Although unwilling to officially cancel the

Eighth Army's offensive, Walker nevertheless began to pull
all of his forward units back into defensive positions.12
Along the west coast of North Korea, the U.S. 24th
Infantry Division and the ROK 12th Regiment, neither of
which had encountered serious resistance thus far, were
ordered to withdraw five miles south in order to consolidate
into a defensive position near the ROK 1st Division.13
Elsewhere in Korea, the U.S. 1st Marine Division and
U.S. 7th Infantry Division began to encounter heavy

107

resistance from Chinese forces approximately 80 miles east
of the Chongchon River battlefield, near the Chosin
Reservoir.

It was becoming painfully obvious to Lieutenant

General Walker that the Chinese had entered the Korean War
in great strength.14
By midday on November 27th, 1950, United Nations
supreme commander General Douglas MacArthur also finally
realized that the Chinese had launched a major offensive
against his overextended forces in Korea.

It is important

to note that in his memoirs, MacArthur gives November 27,
1950, as the date that the Chinese launched their offensive
in Korea.

Yet this date is two days later than when the

offensive actually started.

Even though the memoirs were

published fourteen years after the battle, MacArthur still
gives this erroneous date.

This reveals that Walker was not

alone in being slow to recognize the nature and scope of the
Chinese intervention and indicates that perhaps he was even
influenced by MacArthur's over-optimism.15
Regardless of his miscalculations over the past fortyeight hours, Walker had finally realized that the Chinese
had entered the Korean War in force.

Large numbers of

Chinese soldiers were moving into the void left by the
collapse of the ROK II Corps and appeared poised to envelop
the Eighth Army's right flank.

ROK II Corps commander

General Yu Hae Ueng was making a valiant effort to collect
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stragglers from his shattered corps and deploy them into
defensive positions near the village of Pukchang-ni.16
Even if Yu succeeded his new defensive position would
be 20 miles southeast of the Second Infantry Division, thus
leaving the Second's right flank still dangling in mid-air.
The precarious position of the Second Infantry Division did
not appear to bother Walker, as he was more concerned about
the possibility of a Chinese drive towards the town of
Sunchon, approximately 45 miles south of where the Second
Division was fighting.17
Accordingly on November 27th, Walker decided to
rearrange his units so as to protect against this Chinese
threat to Sunchon.

Walker altered the organizational

structure of the Eighth Army so as to reinforce his IX Corps
which now held the threatened right flank.
The IX Corps was reinforced by units drawn from Eighth
Army reserve, so that by nightfall on November 27th, the IX
Corps was comprised of the U.S. Second Infantry Division,
U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, ROK 6th Division, British
Commonwealth (CW) 27th Brigade, and the Turkish Brigade.18
It thus appeared that Walker had strengthened his right
flank, and lent great assistance to the beleaguered Second
Infantry Division.

But this reinforcement was illusory.

At the same time Walker reinforced the IX Corps, he
also stripped it of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division which he
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reassigned to I Corps in the west.

He also extended IX

Corps area of operations, making it responsible for the
former ROK II Corps positions and thus spreading its lines
ever thinner.19
The assignment of the ROK 6th Division to the IX Corps
provided little help for, as mentioned previously, this
division was grievously understrength and in no shape to
move north and bolster the Second Infantry Division.

The

ROK 6th Division remained in the vicinity of Pukchang-ni,
and tried to collect up stragglers from the other units of
the ROK II Corps.
The U.S. 1st Cavalry Division could have been sent
north to reinforce the Second Infantry Division but, under
orders from Eighth Army, its commander Major General Hobart
Gay scattered his regiments.

Gay moved his 7th and 8th

Cavalry Regiments ten miles east into blocking positions
near Sinchang-ni, behind the ROK 6th Division.

Gay then

sent his 5th Cavalry Regiment north but halted them at the
village of Kaechon, approximately twenty miles south of the
Second Infantry Division, to await developments.

The

British CW 27th Brigade remained in place at Sunchon as a
reserve.20
Thus of all the units Walker used to reinforce the IX
Corps, only the 5,000 man strong Turkish Brigade was
actually ordered to move north and bolster the dangling
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right flank of the Second Infantry Division.

Military

historian and analyst Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall
described the deployment of this lone Turkish Brigade
against the two Chinese armies bearing down on the Second
Division's right flank as "applying an aspirin bottle cork
to the bunghole in a beer barrel."21
Major General Keiser realized that his Second Infantry
Division was becoming more and more isolated, and thus he
decided to withdraw the Second Infantry Division
approximately three miles south, to better defensive
positions near the village of Kujang-dong.

Thus after

forty-eight hours of battle against overwhelming numbers of
Chinese, with both of its flanks driven back and in danger
of envelopment, the Second Infantry Division finally
prepared to yield its forward ground.22
Keiser wanted to completely break contact with the
Chinese and fall back to Sunchon, where the rest of IX Corps
was deploying.

Such a move would have endangered the

elements of the Eighth Army in the west which had become
overextended, and were trying to withdraw into defensive
positions.

Consequently, Walker ordered the Second Infantry

Division to continue its delaying action against the
advancing Chinese from its new defensive position near
Kujang-dong.

Walker intended to use the Second Division as

a shield to stave off the Chinese offensive, while his other
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units withdrew and regrouped.

The few would be sacrificed,

so that the many could be saved.23
The only help that came to the Second Infantry Division
during the Battle of the Chongchon River, was from the U.S.
Air Force.

The official U.S. Air Force history of the

Korean War states that:
Although it was far from niggardly in allocating
air support to the other Eighth Army divisions,
the [USAF] Joint Operations Center gave priority
to air-support requests received from the U.S. 2d
Infantry Division, whose holding action was
permitting other units to withdraw southward.24
These requests for air support poured into the Joint
Operations Center on November 27th, as the Second Infantry
Division reported large numbers of Chinese moving against it
in broad daylight.

The skies over the Chongchon River

valley were clear and cold on November 27th making for good
flying weather.25 On that date, the U.S. Air Force flew
seventy-four sorties in support of the Second Infantry, some
of which produced spectacular results.26 One air strike
struck a group of 50 Chinese while they were crossing an
open field and "burned them to a crisp with napalm."27
In another sector of the Second Infantry Division
front, observers detected large numbers of Chinese filing
into a mine shaft, presumably to rest till darkness, safe
from the circling American aircraft.

But American fighter-

bombers dived onto the mine shaft, scourging its entrance
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with napalm and then scoring several direct hits with 500pound bombs.

This attack caved in the entrance to the mine

shaft and trapped an estimated 600 Chinese inside.

It was

determined by observers on the ground that all 600 Chinese
perished in the attack.28
At 1900 hours on November 27, Keiser issued Operations
Order #11 to the Second Infantry Division.

This order

called for the Second Infantry Division to withdraw three
miles south and establish defensive positions along the
hills and ridges outside the village of Kujang-dong.

Having

been ordered by Eighth Army to hold back the onrushing
Chinese, Keiser at least wanted to make his stand on good
ground.

His order applied to all units of the Second

Infantry Division except the decimated 9th Infantry
Regiment, which due to its heavy losses was ordered to move
further south and go into division reserve near Pugwon.29
The order was not to go into effect until 0600 hours on
November 28th, which meant that the Second Infantry Division
would have to undergo another night of combat in its present
vulnerable defensive position.

One can only speculate why

Keiser chose not to make the withdrawal order effective
until the following day.

In all likelihood he was concerned

that if the withdrawal were to begin when the order was
issued in the late afternoon of the 27th, it would not be
completed before nightfall.

This would leave the Second
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Division strung out along the road and vulnerable to renewed
Chinese attacks.

Keiser therefore decided to move his

division at first light, and endure another night of battle
with the Chinese from his present position.
The Chinese were not slow to press their advantage.

As

darkness again shrouded the battlefield of the Chongchon
River, the Chinese army renewed their assault on the Second
Infantry Division.

Shortly after midnight on the night of

November 27/28 the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment, heavily
damaged and scheduled to be withdrawn into division reserve
on the morrow, found itself assailed by at least a full
division of Chinese.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 9th

Regiment held their ground, although the 3rd's command post
was overrun.

After an hour of heavy fighting, the 1st

Battalion was knocked backward and, under intense enemy
pressure, retreated eastward across the Chongchon River.30
The 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry at this time
barely existed except on paper.

Its rifle "companies” were

by this time hardly stronger than a normal sized platoon,
and it is small wonder that this decimated battalion was
forced backward.

The wonder is how it was able to fight at

all, considering its grievous losses over the past three
days.
PFC Robert B. Bruce had been reunited with the remnants
of the 1st Battalion just before nightfall, and thus found
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himself once more wading the icy waters of the Chongchon
River.

Bruce's wounded hands were bleeding again and had

become infected.

His head was still pounding and his ears

ringing from the effects of the grenade blast two nights
earlier, and he had lost feeling in his feet due to "mild"
frostbite suffered in his countless trips across the
Chongchon River.

Bruce had not been evacuated out because

the battered 9th Infantry Regiment needed every man it could
muster.

The regiment was supposed to go into reserve soon,

and until that time every man who could carry a rifle was
needed on the line.31
The more seriously wounded men of the Second Infantry
Division were sent to the 8076th MASH (Mobile Army Surgical
Hospital), which was set up near the crossroads at Kunu-ri.
By November 27th 1950, the large numbers of wounded men from
the Second Infantry Division were beginning to overwhelm the
staff of the 8076th.

In addition the temperature dropped

precipitously on the night of November 27th, and the bitter
cold greatly hampered the medical staff.
solutions froze solid.
overuse.

Intravenous

Space heaters burned out from

The water nurses boiled to sterilize surgical

instruments had ice forming in it before they could finish
washing them.32
All through the day of November 27th, the doctors and
nurses of the 8076th worked on the broken bodies of the men
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of the Second Infantry Division.

Surgeons were seen warming

their freezing hands over the steam rising from fresh
incisions.

Soon after dark the generator providing

electricity to the operating room broke down, forcing the
surgeons to work by flashlight.

And so they did, on through

the night of November 27th as casualties continued to pour
in.33
Added to the hazards that the cold weather placed on
the men of the Second Infantry Division was the strain of
the round-the-clock nature of the battle, whereby Chinese
units would attack at night and then the Second Infantry
Division would regroup and counter-attack during the day.
By the evening of November 27th 1950, the men of the Second
Infantry Division had been fighting for three days and two
nights with hardly more than a few hours pause to rest, all
while engaging an enemy who possessed overwhelming numerical
superiority.

"As the days wore on" recalled Sergeant Robert

Hammersmith of the 38th Infantry Regiment, "I don't remember
hardly getting any sleep at all, just constant continuously
moving and fighting.1,34
Hammersmith's 38th Infantry Regiment was the most hard
pressed of any unit in the Second Infantry Division or for
that matter in the whole Eighth Army.

On the night of

November 27th, elements of the Chinese 42nd Army turned west
from their breach in the ROK II Corps former positions, and
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struck the 38th Infantry Regiment shortly before 2400 hours
on November 27th.

Another Chinese force, from either the

4 0th or 39th Army, launched heavy attacks on the 38th
Infantry Regiment from the north.

Although U.S. Army

estimates vary, at least one and possibly as many as three
Chinese divisions took turns striking the 38th Infantry
Regiment throughout the night of November 27th and into the
morning hours of November 28th.35
It is difficult to discern exactly which Chinese units
were attacking the Second Infantry Division at this stage of
the battle, because the Chinese were shifting large numbers
of men eastward, so as to exploit the opening in the former
ROK II Corps position.

Four Chinese armies (the 38th, 39th,

40th, and 42nd) were identified in the Second Infantry
Division zone of operations by November 28th, and elements
of all these units were either attacking the division or
moving past its right flank to come around behind it.
This Chinese movement around the right flank of the
Second Infantry Division, and the simultaneous Chinese
assaults, were facilitated by the lack of any covering force
on the right flank of the division.

It will be remembered

that, of all the units transferred to the right flank of
Eighth Army, only the Turkish Brigade had been ordered to
move northeast to cover the exposed flank of the Second
Infantry Division.

But this small force had run into a
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large amount of trouble.
As an early recipient of United States aid under the
"Truman Doctrine," and as a nation which bordered the Soviet
Union and was itself a possible target of communist
aggression, Turkey had both moral and political reasons for
sending troops to fight in Korea.

The Turks sent a 5,000

man brigade, officially titled the Turkish Army Command
Force, under the command of Brigadier General Tahsin Yazici.
The Turks were equipped with U.S. weapons and transported to
Korea.

They arrived at the South Korean port of Pusan on

October 18, 1950.36
Although a hand-picked force, the Turkish Brigade was
green to combat.

Turkey had not fought a war since 192 3

and, with a few notable exceptions, none of the men in the
Turkish Brigade had been in battle.

Their brief one month

in Korea had been spent mainly in shuttling from one place
to another without ever getting into the fighting.

That was

all about to change.37
The Turks were alerted for possible action on the night
of November 26th, when Eighth Army headquarters first
learned of the collapse of the ROK II Corps.

The Turkish

Brigade was ordered to move northeast to the village of
Wawon that night, and then resume its advance the following
day (27th) by moving further north retaking the village of
Tokchon, and join up with the Second Infantry Division.

The
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Turkish commander Brigadier General Yazici recalled:
Further intelligence was asked for about the enemy
and the ROK corps, but none was available: or more
information was not supplied lest it lower the
morale of the Turkish Brigade.38
Moving north from Wawon along a narrow dirt road the
Turks encountered large numbers of civilians and South
Korean soldiers streaming towards the rear.

Unknown to the

Turks, interspersed in the refugee columns were large
numbers of North Korean guerrillas and Chinese soldiers
wearing South Korean uniforms.

These men filed past the

Turks, along with the rest of the refugees.

Once out of

sight, they shed their disguises and set up ambush positions
all along the road up which the Turks had just traveled.39
Chinese infiltration teams and North Korean guerrillas
were an integral part of the Chinese plan of attack at the
Battle of the Chongchon River.

Not only did these

guerrillas set up roadblocks behind combat units, they also
operated far behind the United Nations frontline.

At 03 00

hours on November 28th, 1950, a Chinese biplane dropped a
string of fragmentation bombs on the U.S. Air Force 8th
Fighter Bomber Group's parking ramp at Pyongyang Airfield,
approximately 80 miles south of where the Second Infantry
Division was engaged.

The bombs killed one man, destroyed

three F-bl Mustangs, and damaged eight more.

A subsequent

U.S. Air Force investigation of the incident revealed that
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the uncanny accuracy of the communist aircraft's attack may
have been due to help from the ground in illuminating the
target.

Six of the "Korean" laborers employed at the base

turned out to be Chinese, one of whom was positively
identified as an officer in the Chinese Communist Forces.40
As the Turkish Brigade moved north, a U.S. observation
aircraft detected a large force of Chinese moving southwest
towards the Turks.

Upon receiving this information, Eighth

Army ordered Yazici to turn his column around and take up a
defensive position approximately seven miles east of Wawon.
Yazici misinterpreted this command, and instead ordered his
Brigade to return to Wawon itself.41
Just turning the column around was a major
accomplishment for Yazici.

The narrow one-lane road his

brigade was on was flanked by a sheer cliff on one side, and
a sharply sloping embankment on the other.

As a result it

took several hours to get their trucks and other vehicles
turned around.42
Much of the Turkish brigade was still on the road when
darkness fell on November 27th.

As it grew dark, the Turks

began receiving sniper fire from the Chinese infiltrators on
the hillsides around them.

Suddenly the rear of the Turkish

column was attacked by a large Chinese force, which Yazici
later estimated at division strength.

The Turks fought

their way back down the road, finally reaching Wawon where
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they hastily deployed into a defensive perimeter.
When a large force of soldiers suddenly appeared out of
the darkness, the Turks opened fire and charged the "enemy"
with fixed bayonets.

They took over 100 prisoners and

killed or wounded hundreds more.

Yazici informed Eighth

Army headquarters that his men had won a great victory and
sent the prisoners back for interrogation.

These prisoners

turned out to be South Korean soldiers who had been caught
between the Turks and the advancing Chinese.43
The real Chinese were right on the South Korean's heels
and soon launched a massive attack on the Turks.

Yazici

later estimated that at least 20,000 Chinese struck his
brigade that night.44
"They were attacking in hundreds, thousands" stated
Turkish 2nd Lieutenant Orhan Akpolat, "In truth this is the
way it was, they were encircling us.
to break out of their encirclement.

It was very difficult
The fighting was at

very close quarters.1,45
The fight was "at very close quarters," because both
the Chinese and Turks welcomed hand-to-hand fighting.

The

Turks would fire their weapons for awhile before meeting the
Chinese assault with a bayonet charge of their own.

These

tactics seemed to throw the Chinese off balance, and the
Turks forced back several Chinese attacks.

Gradually, the

superior numbers of the Chinese began to turn the tide of
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battle in their favor.
As the Chinese assault waves struck the Turkish lines
at Wawon, Turkish officers were seen throwing their fur hats
onto the ground, to mark the spot from which they would
rather die than retreat.

Many Turks did die, but they

hurled back the Chinese with cold steel.

Turkish Private

Haci Altiner recalled: "How shall I say?

We and the Chinese

suffered enormous casualties.

There was so much blood that

it ran like rivulets in a thunderstorm.

That was a great

battle."46 The Turks held their ground and, as daylight
came on November 28th, Wawon remained in friendly hands.
The Turkish Brigade, for all its valor, had taken heavy
casualties; and its position at Wawon was still 10 miles
southeast of the Second Infantry Division's position near
Kujang-dong.

Through that ten mile wide gap, units of

General Li Tianyu's CCF XIII Army Group were moving, in an
attempt to encircle and destroy the Second Infantry
Division.

The Second Division was the sole remaining

obstacle barring Li's men from their objective of enveloping
and destroying the Eighth Army.
Once again, EUSAK G-2 was slow to recognize the
dangerous situation Eighth Army now faced.

Its intelligence

summary for November 27th, 1950, described the Chinese
assault on the Second Infantry Division and Turks as
"regimental sized enemy attacks on three fronts (resulting
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in) friendly readjustment of positions."

Ominously though,

EUSAK G—2 concluded its "Enemy Capabilities" report for
November 27th by estimating that the Chinese and North
Korean's would "attack south with reinforced forces against
friendly positions, continue guerilla activity throughout
EUSAK zone, and be further reinforced by Chinese Communist
and/or Soviet Forces."47

November 28th

The Second Infantry Division began to assemble in the
early morning hours of November 28th, 1950 in preparation to
execute Division Operations Order #11.

But the battles of

November 27th, 1950, had already made the order obsolete
because most of the positions to which the elements of the
Second Division were to withdraw to, were now held by
Chinese forces that had rushed through the breach on the
right flank.

The Second Infantry Division found itself in a

"cul de sac," with strong Chinese units on three sides which
were moving to cut across the rear of the division and
encircle it completely.48
Consequently, Keiser countermanded Operations Order #11
with Operations Order #12, by which the Second Division
would execute a fighting withdrawal 15 miles southward to
the crossroads of Kunu-ri.

The 23rd Infantry Regiment was

reinforced with the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry
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Regiment to form a task force charged with guarding the rear
of the division as it made its withdrawal.

The withdrawal

was complicated by the need of the 38th Infantry Regiment to
withdraw three miles west along its narrow supply road,
before it could move south down the main valley road.

As a

result, the division's rearguard had to hold a forward
position north of Ku jang-dong.49
The tremendous traffic load was too much to be
accommodated by the two lane gravel road that served as the
main "highway" in the Chongchon River valley and traffic
"was often literally solid from Kujang-dong to Kunu-ri."50
The rearguard during the Second Division's withdrawal
to Kunu-ri consisted of the 1st Battalion of the 23rd
Infantry Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry
Regiment.

The 2nd Battalion of the 9th Regiment set up a

blocking position behind the 1st Battalion of the 23rd,
after which the 1st would "leap-frog" that unit to establish
another position further down the road.

In this manner,

these units would guard the rear of the column as it slowly
traveled southward.

Captain Sherman W. Pratt, who commanded

"Baker" Company, 1st Battalion 23rd Infantry Regiment, later
recalled the appearance of the men of the Second Infantry
Division who retreated past his rearguard position:
Their appearance attested to the severity of the
fighting in which they had been engaged now for
almost three days. They were all dirty, unshaven,
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weary looking beyond description and with blank
expressions on hollow and gaunt faces.51
The Chinese followed the retreating Second Infantry
Division closely, sniping at the column from the hills,
firing mortar shells at it, and occasionally even launching
small assaults on its rearguard.

Pratt walked among his

soldiers in their rearguard positions and tried to keep
their spirits up.

As he made his rounds Pratt spied a

soldier, whom he remembered only as "Ernie," and whom he had
last seen fighting off a large group of Chinese the night
before.

Noticing the depressed look in the man's face,

Pratt said "Cheer up Ernie!

We'll get out of this okay."

Ernie replied "Wish I could believe that, Captain, but I
doubt if you very much believe it yourself."
Pratt replied "It's a dark hour just now."

"You're right"
Ernie was killed

later that night by a Chinese hand grenade.52
The narrow road along the Chongchon River became so
clogged with the vehicles of the Second Infantry Division,
that total gridlock soon ensued.

The column moved so slowly

that most of the division had yet to cover the 15 miles to
Kunu-ri before darkness fell on November 28th.

It was after

midnight before all of the Second Division's units were able
deploy into their assigned positions.
On November 28th, the rest of the Eighth Army was
withdrawing in the west under light enemy pressure.

Many of
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its units had yet to see any action against the enemy, as
the main Chinese offensive was still striking the Eighth
Army's right flank held by the U.S. Second Infantry
Division.

On the left flank of the Eighth Army was the

crack ROK 1st Division, which was commanded by General Paik
Sun Yup.

Paik later recalled:

Most of my officers and men were bewildered that
the mighty ROK 1st Division was withdrawing
without a single slugfest worthy of the name. We
crossed the Chongchon River [at its mouth] heading
south on November 28, 1950. It was snowing.53
While the entire Eighth Army moved south on November
28th, an event occurred that was completely overlooked at
the time, yet would have terrifying consequences later.

Roadblock at Samso-ri

The U.S. 1st Cavalry Division had been ordered by
Eighth Army to move into position alongside the ROK 6th
Division near Pukchang-ni.

Before deploying his division,

Major General Gay ordered the 5th Cavalry Regiment to move
south from the village of Kaechon to Sunchon, to rejoin the
rest of the 1st Cavalry Division.54
The 5th Cavalry Regiment headed south on the morning of
November 28th, but after moving approximately six miles the
lead elements of the regiment were ambushed near the village
of Samso-ri.

The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of

the regiment was cut to pieces by enemy automatic weapons
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fire, with only the platoon sergeant and three other men
escaping.

The 5th Cavalry rushed its 2nd battalion forward

and attacked down both sides of the road, but failed to
dislodge the Chinese holding the high ground.55
After the initial skirmishing, the Americans realized
that the enemy soldiers facing them were not North Korean
guerrillas but Chinese soldiers who held the road in force.
After several probes by the 5th Cavalry failed to dislodge
the enemy, its commander decided to bypass the roadblock by
moving several miles west before turning south towards
Sunchon.

After many hours, the 5th Cavalry Regiment finally

reached its destination of Sunchon well after dark on the
night of November 28th.56
A Chinese force, large enough to stop an entire fresh
and full strength U.S. Army regiment, had established a
roadblock at Samso-ri, ,just three miles east of the Second
Infantry Division's main supply route and ten miles south of
where the division was deploying for battle.

Yet there is

no record that the Second Division was ever notified of this
development.

Thus Major General Laurence Keiser's attention

remained focused on his front and dangling right flank,
while powerful Chinese forces were establishing themselves
behind his positions.
As its units filed in on the night of November 28th,
the Second Infantry Division formed a defensive arc north of
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the village of Kunu-ri.

The left flank of the Second

Division was held by the remnants of the 9th Infantry
Regiment and the center by the 23rd Infantry Regiment.

On

the right flank, the ROK 3rd and U.S. 38th Infantry
Regiments were supposed to deploy on the high ground along
Piho-san Ridge, a few miles north of Kunu-ri.

But upon

arriving at the ridge, the 38th and ROK 3rd discovered
powerful Chinese forces had sideslipped past the Second
Division's open right flank and had occupied the ridge in
great strength.57
Consequently, the ROK 3rd and U.S. 38th Infantry
Regiments deployed on the low ground south of Piho-san
Ridge, where they once again found themselves with a narrow
east-west road at their backs as their only supply route and
their only possible route of retreat.

On the extreme right

flank, the Turkish Brigade held the line near the village of
Kaechon, as it had been assigned directly to the Second
Infantry Division after its encounter with the Chinese at
Wawon.58
Once again, on paper, this deployment looked
formidable, but in the words of the official Second Infantry
Division history, the units holding the defensive line at
Kunu-ri on the night of November 28th "bore little
resemblance to their previous organizations."59 All the
regiments had experienced severe combat, some for four
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consecutive days and nights.

The 9th Infantry Regiment had

been reduced to one effective battalion (the 2nd) after the
first night of combat, and that battalion had suffered
grievous losses during its trial of battle over the
following three days and nights.

The 38th Infantry had

suffered heavy losses as well, though not as grievous as the
9th Regiment.

Thus Colonel Paul Freeman's 2 3rd Infantry

Regiment remained the most powerful force left in the Second
Infantry Division by the evening of November 28th, and for
this reason, Keiser gave the 23rd Infantry the task of
holding the Second Division's center.60
From its new positions at Kunu-ri, the Second Infantry
Division was ordered by Eighth Army headquarters to continue
its delaying action against the Chinese until other Eighth
Army units had completed their withdrawal south of the
Chinese flanking attack.61 Keiser would have preferred that
the Second Division continue its withdrawal on November
29th, south to Sunchon where he could form a solid defensive
line with his right flank anchored by the U.S. 1st Cavalry
Division.

But Lt. General Walton Walker decided otherwise

and continued to believe the safety of the rest of Eighth
Army required the Second Division to make a stand at Kunuri.

Walker's views ar^ well expressed by historian Roy

Appleman: "For compelling reasons the 2nd Division had to be
stopped in a vulnerable position at Kunu-ri for the benefit
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of the rest of the army."62
On the front and flanks of the Second Infantry
Division, approximately 5-6 Chinese divisions (50,000-60,000
men) were massing to try and shatter it, and enable the
Chinese to intercept the rest of Eighth Army as it was
retreating southward.63 The men of the Second Infantry
Division were unaware that they were fighting not just for
their own lives, but also to buy time for tens of thousands
of their fellow soldiers in other divisions to disengage and
form a new defensive line.

In war there is only one way to

buy time, and that is with the blood of your soldiers.

It

is written in the book of the Apostle John that: "No greater
love hath any man than this.

That he lay down his life for

his friend."64 In those final bitter days of November 1950,
the soldiers of the Second Infantry Division fought and died
a

so that others might be saved.

Crisis at the Top

While the Second Infantry Division redeployed near the
crossroads of Kunu-ri, the news of the Chinese intervention
into the Korean War was being flashed around the world.

On

November 28, 1950, the Supreme Commander of United Nations
forces in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur, informed
President Harry Truman that at least 200,000 Chinese
soldiers had entered the Korean War, and were launching a
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massive offensive against UN forces throughout the whole of
Korea.

As a result, MacArthur informed Truman that he had

halted offensive operations, and authorized local
withdrawals.

MacArthur's message continued:

All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to
North Korean troops...can now be completely
abandoned. The Chinese military forces are
committed in Korea in great and ever increasing
strength. We face an entirely new war. It is
quite evident that our present strength of force
is not sufficient to meet this undeclared war by
the Chinese.65
Unknown to MacArthur, his army now faced 300,000
Chinese soldiers, 100,000 more than he had reported to
Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.66 This is an
important point, because MacArthur was arguing that "our
present strength of force is not sufficient" to fight
200,000 Chinese.

Obviously then, his forces were even less

prepared to do battle with 300,000 Chinese.

Thus the

largest American military force deployed anywhere in the
world at that time was in danger of being completely
overwhelmed and destroyed by the Communist Chinese.
Alan Jackson of CBS Radio began his morning broadcast
on November 28th, 1950, with the following news bulletin:
Good morning everybody, although it's not a good
morning for the United Nations army in Korea, or
the cause of democracy throughout the world.
General MacArthur has announced a brand new war
against 200,000 [sic] Chinese Communist troops who
right now are rolling back American, British,
Turkish, and South Korean forces in the most
serious U.N. retreat of the war. These
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developments have come with stunning suddenness in
the past few hours resulting in a communique from
MacArthur's headquarters which is perhaps the
gravest document of its kind since World War IX.
It makes news so serious that all other
developments this morning, storms, domestic
politics, seem minor indeed in comparison.67
The news from Korea sent Shockwaves through Washington
and on the afternoon of November 28th, Truman hastily
convened an emergency meeting of the National Security
Council.

The minutes of that meeting reveal that the

leading figures of the Truman Administration were confused
by the sudden turn of events in Korea.

Overnight, the

Truman Administration's policy for waging the Korean War
changed from a quest for military victory to an effort to
end the conflict by diplomatic means.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar
Bradley, opened the meeting with an incredibly optimistic
briefing on the rapidly deteriorating military situation in
Korea.

Bradley contended that the "reports...about the

strength and momentum of the Chinese communist offensive
might well be exaggerated."

He went on to say that he

"doubted that our lines had been breached... and that it was
entirely possible that the Chinese offensive might not go
very far because of the extremely difficult terrain...and
difficult Chinese supply situation.1,68
General Bradley then expressed his estimate that: "The
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Chinese communists have an air potential of at least 300
bombers on nearby fields in Manchuria.

These bombers could

seriously curtail our airlift (of supplies), and our planes
were jammed so closely on the fields in Korea that surprise
raids could do us very great damage."69 In spite of this
danger to which he had alluded, Bradley said that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff did not believe that MacArthur should be
authorized to bomb airfields in Manchuria.

General Bradley

concluded his briefing by reporting that:
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not recommend that
any additional Reserve components be ordered up
now. He said that there were no additional troops
that could be sent to General MacArthur and that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not plan to try and
send any others. General Bradley said that the
Joint Chiefs felt just as strongly as the three
Secretaries [Army, Navy, Air Force] that we should
not let ourselves be pulled into any war in
China.70
Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall heartily
concurred with Bradley's opinion on war with China in
asserting that:
he would like to repeat again the point which the
three Service Secretaries had regarded as the most
important item in their memorandum, namely, not
getting ourselves involved individually, or as a
United Nations matter, in a general war with
China.71
Vice President Alben Barkley interrupted the discussion
to launch a rambling attack on General MacArthur, demanding
to know if MacArthur had really made "the statement
attributed to him a week ago that the boys in Korea would be

133

home by Christmas."

"I am going to be asked all kinds of

questions about this on the Hill", Barkley complained.72
Secretary of State Dean Acheson joined the discussion
and:
asked everyone to remember that the Soviet Union
had been behind every move. Whatever we think of
current happenings in Korea must be in the light
of world events, and the three Secretaries and
General Marshall were very wise in emphasizing the
fact that we must not, under any circumstances,
become involved in a general war with China. Mr.
Acheson said we must ask ourselves, what do we
want in Korea? The answer is easy, "We want to
terminate it". We don't want to beat China in
Korea,— we can't. We don't want to beat China any
place— we can't.73
MacArthur was as outraged at the lack of support from
President Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State
Department, as he was at the Chinese.

Years later when

writing his memoirs, MacArthur expressed the frustration he
felt at what he considered to be a lack of support by the
leadership in Washington for his men in Korea.

MacArthur

wrote:
No solution was advanced as to the problem of
reinforcement but rather toward unrealistically
expecting the impossible from men who had gone in
to fight one war [against North Korea], had won
it, and were now trying to fight a much bigger
one.74
In regards to whether or not China could be defeated in
Korea, MacArthur would write:
The thought of defeat in Korea had never been
entertained by me. It was my belief that, if
allowed to use my full military might, without
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artificial restrictions, I could not only save
Korea, but also inflict such a destructive blow
upon Red China's capacity to wage aggressive war
that it would remove her as a further threat to
peace in Asia for generations to come.75
The "artificial restrictions" that MacArthur referred
to were the orders from President Truman which prohibited
him from attacking the Chinese mainland, even with only air
or naval forces.

MacArthur was only allowed to fight those

Chinese forces which actually entered Korea, while the
Truman Administration maintained the diplomatic fiction that
the United States was engaged in a "police action" in Korea
and was not at war with Communist China.76
War with China had nonetheless already come, whether
Truman or his advisors wanted to admit it or not.

While

Truman and his advisors worried over possible Soviet moves
against Europe, and MacArthur ranted over the lack of
support his command was receiving, the men of the United
States Second Infantry Division tried to stay alive for just
one more day.
Eight thousand miles from the council rooms of
Washington, D.C., amidst the frozen wind-swept hills of
Korea, the men of the Second Division prepared for another
day of battle with the Chinese foe.

There would be no

relief for these men, only more suffering and more dying.
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CHAPTER V
KUNU-RI
"If you have a son overseas, write to him.
If you have a son in the Second Division, pray for him*"
Walter Winchell

On November 29, 1950, the U.S. Second Infantry Division
braced itself for another day of battle amidst the low hills
south of the crossroads at Kunu-ri.

Although the attention

of the Second Infantry Division was focused on the Chinese
threat to its front and flanks, large numbers of Chinese
soldiers were slipping past its open right flank and
preparing to spring a massive ambush on the division.
In the pre-dawn darkness of November 29, 1950, a
Turkish convoy carrying supplies for the Turkish Brigade,
headed north from Sunchon up the main supply road of the
Second Infantry Division bound for Kunu-ri, a journey of
approximately seven miles.

Along the way, this Turkish

convoy was ambushed, and lost several men and vehicles.

The

survivors of the ambush pulled into Major General Laurence
Reiser's Second Infantry Division command post shortly after
sunrise and in broken English desperately attempted to
communicate what had happened to them.1
The only thing the Americans could discern from what
the excited Turks said, was that they had been shot at
139
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somewhere along the road from Sunchon to Kunu-ri.

As the

remnants of the Turkish supply convoy continued on their way
towards Kaechon to try and join their Brigade attached to
the right flank of the Second Infantry Division, Keiser
ordered a Military Police (MP) platoon to move south and see
if they could find out exactly what the Turks had
encountered.2
The MP platoon headed south at 0900 hours on November
29th, and after proceeding approximately two miles came
under heavy machinegun and small arms fire.

The MPs lost

four men killed and wounded, before beating a hasty retreat
back up the road to inform Second Division headquarters that
there was a roadblock in place on the division's supply
road.

Keiser immediately dispatched the 2nd Reconnaissance

Company to attack the roadblock and eliminate it.

The 2nd

Reconnaissance Company attacked the roadblock at 1000 hours
but failed to make any headway.3
The enemy forces holding the road were ascertained to
be Chinese, and the roadblock was actually discovered to be
a "fireblock" of Chinese with automatic weapons entrenched
on both sides of the road.

Even though no physical

obstruction appeared to block the road far larger numbers of
Chinese were present than the Americans had anticipated.
At 1240 hours, Keiser reinforced the 2nd Reconnaissance
Company with Company C of the 38th Infantry Regiment and a

tank platoon from the 72nd Tank Battalion and ordered this
task force to destroy the enemy roadblock.

But this attack

failed as well, and Second Division headquarters' estimate
enemy strength at the roadblock was now raised from a few
i

dozen men to a reinforced company of approximately 300 men.4
Keiser next ordered a battery of 155-mm howitzers from
the 503rd Field Artillery to give supporting fire to the
task force attempting to eliminate the roadblock.

Even with

this additional support the task force still could not
dislodge the Chinese from their entrenched positions on the
high ground overlooking the road.5
Keiser grew increasingly frustrated with what he
considered to be a nuisance in his division's rear area, but
considered it to be no more than that.

Of far greater

concern to him were the large formations of Chinese moving
down the Chongchon valley to his front and massing in the
hills and valleys on his flanks.
Exactly how many Chinese attacked the Second Infantry
Division on November 29th, 1950, and to which units they
belonged, is difficult to ascertain.

The Chinese shifted

many divisions from their initial battle deployment in order
to concentrate their forces against the open right flank of
the Second Infantry Division.

Chinese units first

identified by the Second Division to be on its front had now
redeployed on its right, and fresh Chinese units had moved
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eastward into the division's zone of operations as the
remainder of Eighth Army in the west disengaged and
withdrew.
From the prisoner interrogation reports filed by Eighth
Army Intelligence at the time of the battle, and from
captured Chinese documents reproduced in official U.S. Army
histories, I have been able to determine the Chinese order
of battle facing the Second Infantry Division when night
fell on November 29, 1950:
On the left flank and left center: two divisions
from the CCF 39th Army
In the center: entire CCF 40th Army (118th, 119th,
and 120th Divisions)
On the right flank: 112th and 114th Divisions of
the CCF 38th Army
Holding roadblock on Second Division's supply
road: 113th Division, CCF 38th Army.6
Taking into account the probable casualties suffered by
the Chinese in the previous four days and nights of battle,
the total strength of Chinese forces opposing the Second
Infantry Division for the final two days of the Battle of
the Chongchon River was approximately 65,000 men.

This is

5,000 more men than both MacArthur's Intelligence and EUSAK
G-2 had estimated China had throughout the whole of Korea,
when the UN offensive had began on November 24th.7
Across the south end of the Chongchon valley the United
States Second Infantry Division deployed for battle.

Given
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enough time, the Second Division could have dug into the
hills south of Kunu-ri, and possibly turned back the
onrushing Chinese.

But time was something that Li Tianyu's

Chinese XIII Army Group would not allow the Americans to
have.

Determined to press his advantage, Li ordered his men

to continue their attacks and their pursuit of the
withdrawing Second Division during the daylight hours of
November 29th.
Smoke screens were laid down by the advancing Chinese
to mask their troop movements.

Once again, the forests of

Korea burned as the Dragon moved.

Through brief openings in

the haze, aerial observers reported entire Chinese regiments
"dog-trotting" down the roads and valley floors on the east
flank of the Second Infantry Division.

Air strikes were

called in, but the Chinese quickly disappeared into the
haze.

The air strikes themselves set more fires and

generated yet more smoke, furthering hampering U.S. air
support.8
By late afternoon the Chinese fireblock was still in
place on the Second Division's main supply road, and both
Keiser and his regimental commanders were beginning to worry
about this threat.
At 1445 hours Colonel George Peploe, commanding the
38th Infantry Regiment, radioed Keiser's headquarters
requesting permission to evacuate his supply trains and aid
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station through Kunu-ri southward to Sunchon.

Peploe was

"informed that roadblock not cleared and to remain in
position until given word.

Periodic checks should be made

every hour."9
At 1528 hours, Peploe again radioed in "Can we go
through to Sunchon yet?

We have a lot of wounded."

The G-3

(Operations) officer of the Second Infantry Division, Lt.
Colonel Maurice Holden, informed Peploe that his supply
trains and wounded would be diverted west "through Anju and
then Sinanju, where a MASH Hospital and air evacuation
facilities are located.

The roadblock is still in."10

At 163 0 hours, Major General Keiser sent a message
requesting assistance to Major General John Coulter, the
commanding general of the IX Corps.

It marked the first

time in the Battle of the Chongchon River that the Second
Infantry Division actually requested reinforcements.
Reiser's message stated:
Serious roadblock to South. Estimated enemy
battalion or more. Air strikes, artillery, and
Infantry Company attacks have failed. Road jammed
with vehicles prevents movement North or South.
Request immediate assistance from the South to
relieve situation. Please notify action taken as
all infantry elements definitely engaged.11
The function of the American corps commanders in the
Battle of the Chongchon River was almost purely
administrative, as they were concerned mainly with
coordinating movements of troops and supplies rather than
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making tactical decisions in combat.

But if the Second

Infantry Division was to be reinforced, it would have to be
by the authority of either IX Corps or, further up the chain
of command, Eighth Army.
Since Lieutenant General Walton Walker had reinforced
IX Corps, Coulter had units available that could assist the
Second Division.

Accordingly IX Corps informed Keiser that

a battalion from the British Commonwealth 27th Brigade,
would attack north from Sunchon on the morning of November
30th.

Simultaneously the Second Division was to drive

south to join the 27th Brigade in eliminating the Chinese
roadblock.12
At approximately 1700 hours on November 29th, while the
Second Division's task force was still attacking the Chinese
fireblock on the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road, Lieutenant General
Walton Walker ordered the entire Eighth Army to fall back to
a new defensive position.

The Second Infantry Division was

ordered to abandon Kunu-ri, and retreat 20 miles south to
Sunchon.

Only minutes before Walker made this decision, the

lead elements of the CCF 38th Army emerged from the smoke
filled valleys in the east, and attacked the Second Infantry
Division's right flank, held by the 38th Infantry Regiment
and the Turkish Brigade near the village of Kaechon.13
The CCF 38th Army hit the 38th Regiment's 3rd Battalion
head on, then sent strong columns wheeling westward and
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southward around the Turkish Brigade at Kaechon.

The Turks

immediately opened fire on the Chinese, but the Chinese had
no intention of assaulting Kaechon.

While Chinese mortar

fire crashed into Kaechon, pinning the Turks down, Chinese
units in regimental strength swung south around Kaechon, and
then headed northwest, grabbing a hill mass that dominated
the supply road of the 38th Infantry Regiment and the
Turkish Brigade.14
Colonel George Peploe's worst nightmare had come true.
For the entire battle Peploe's 38th Infantry Regiment had
been forced to use for both supply and withdrawal, narrow
roads that ran parallel to his frontline.

The threat of a

Chinese penetration of his lines that might result in a
severing of his regimental supply road, had been foremost in
Peploe's mind.15
Now the Chinese forces had severed this line and held
the road connecting the 38th Regiment and Turkish Brigade to
the rest of the Second Infantry Division.

No sooner had

Peploe learned this, than he found the entire Turkish
Brigade retreating west out of Kaechon and clogging the road
with its vehicles.

Attempts by Keiser and Peploe to contact

Brigadier General Yazitii over the radio failed, and no one
seemed to know the whereabouts of his headquarters.16
Unknown to the Second Infantry Division, Yazici, after
seeing that his position was flanked, had ordered the
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Turkish Brigade to withdraw west before the Chinese
completely cut the 38th Regiment's supply road.

Then Yazici

and his staff drove off, running by the Chinese in the hills
and apparently driving past Reiser's Second Infantry
Division command post later that evening.

When Yazici

disappeared, the Turks were left leaderless and they soon
became a disorganized mass retreating west down the road.17

The heavy Chinese attacks on the 38th Infantry Regiment
prompted General Keiser to issue new orders to Peploe,
commanding him to withdraw west to Kunu-ri.

Under heavy

attack, Peploe attempted to withdraw his units as best he
could.

Peploe's movement was made infinitely more

complicated by the unauthorized withdrawal of the Turkish
Brigade, and by the fact that large numbers of Chinese had
already established firing positions overlooking the
wi thdr awa 1 route.18
Captain Reginald Hinton dispatched two tanks from his
regimental tank company to guard the 38th Infantry
Regiment's artillery pieces until they could safely
withdraw.19
Commanding one of these M4A3E8 Sherman tanks was
Sergeant First Class Robert Sevy, and he and his tank driver
Corporal James Scoon have vivid memories of that night of
November 29, 1950.

Assigned to guard the regimental
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artillery, Sevy and Scoon had no sooner arrived and taken up
positions east of the guns, than the artillerymen hooked up
their guns to their trailers and withdrew, never telling the
tankers that they were leaving.

By the time the tankers

realized that the artillerymen had left, large numbers of
Chinese were deploying along the ridges that dominated the
narrow dirt road that the tanks were on.20
Gunning his engine, Scoon drove his Sherman west down
the road, falling in behind a battalion of Turkish soldiers
who were in trucks and jeeps and also retreating.

But upon

reaching a point where the road went through a narrow pass,
the column was brought to a halt.

Chinese forces held both

sides of the pass in great strength and were delivering
deadly machinegun and mortar fire onto the clogged road.
The Turkish soldiers apparently panicked at this point and
abandoned their vehicles on the road.21
Sevy and Scoon found their tank stuck in the "log jam"
of vehicles, east of ttie pass.

To their front was the

abandoned column of Turkish vehicles.

Behind them was the

other tank in their platoon as well as advancing units of
the Chinese 38th Army.

Somewhere further up the road,

caught up in the Turkish vehicles, were the other tanks of
their company.

On the tankers right was a sheer cliff

dropping down nearly forty feet to a dry wash, and to their
left was another cliff rising forty to fifty feet above
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them, and literally swarming with Chinese.

Sevy and Scoon

would spend the entire night of November 29th, 1950 in this
precarious position.

Sevy recalled:

We really caught hell that night boy! They
[Chinese] were throwing white phosphorous grenades
on top of the tank, off of the cliff above us, and
the bugles and everything going, and just a
horrendous thing. Them old seals on those hatches
wasn't no damn good on those wore out World War II
tanks, and I looked down at the drivers seat and
Jim [Scoon] was a sitting down there just glowing.
And I said; 'Jim you better get them goddamn
clothes off and throw them out because you got
white phosphorous all over you. /22
At the west end of the road, Captain Hinton recalled
watching the Turkish Brigade come spilling out of the pass
late on the night of November 29th:
I had tanks up this valley and they got stuck up
in there because the Turks bugged out. I don't
mind saying that because I was there. Nobody said
anything about it at the time because it was an
international operation and they didn't want to
degrade anybody. Bullshit! They bugged! Jim
Nabors [one of Hinton's officers] and I stood on
the road and they were running out of that valley
like a crowd coming out of a football stadium. We
found an officer with them, and we knew he spoke
English because he had been in the command post
earlier. And we stopped him and told him to help
us get them [the Turks] turned around. He said 'I
have no command authority, I'm an adjutant!', and
off he went. So they abandoned their artillery,
their trucks, everything up in this narrow valley,
and nothing could get out of there.23
This description of the Turkish Brigade completely
contradicts the first American reports of its courageous
stand at Wawon, and brings up a subject of some controversy
in writings both on the Battle of the Chongchon River in
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particular and the Korean War in general.
Billy Mossman, the official Army historian of this
phase of the Korean War, and military historian Clay Blair
in his book The Forgotten War, offer extremely negative
views of the performance of the Turkish troops and their
commander.

S.L.A. Marshall and Roy Appleman have a somewhat

neutral opinion on the Turks fighting abilities, while T.R.
Fehrenbach, a rifle company commander in the Second Infantry
Division at the battle/ heaps laudatory praise on the
brigade in his book This Kind of War.

Major General Warren

Hodges served as the 38th Infantry Regiment's operations
officer during the Battle of the Chongchon River, and he
sheds some light on the controversy:
I got all kinds of reports at the time. Ones that
said they were great fighters and ones that said
they weren't worth a damn. I know that later on
[in his career] I observed the Turkish Army, and I
found out they were typical of most of those
countries over there [Middle East]. There's no
initiative. If they're not told what to do, they
don't usually know what to do. I think if they
are well led they are damn good fighters, and
brother as individuals they are as bloodthirsty as
they come. But it's the leadership that they
need.24
On the basis of Hodge's testimony and other eyewitness
accounts of the Turks fighting abilities, it would appear
that the main cause of the Turkish Brigade's poor
performance on the night of November 29, 1950, was the
absence of its commander, Brigadier General Yazici, who had
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inexplicably abandoned his brigade at this critical moment
of the battle.
Hinton, who remained concerned about his tank crews
still stuck on the road, desperately attempted to reach them
on the radio from his command jeep.

But because of the

mountainous terrain, he had trouble radioing them and was
obliged to drive his jeep up to the entrance of the valley
in order to communicate.25
Hinton had a SCR 503 radio designed for use inside a
tank.

Consequently the console of the radio had two large

lights on the front.

When one turned on the radio a blue

light lit up; and when one depressed a button to speak into
the transmitter, a red light came on as well.

In the

darkness of the battlefield that night, the lights from the
radio brought unwelcome attention to Hinton from the nearby
Chinese, who would open fire when they saw the lights come
on.

"Everytime I had to go over to that jeep," Hinton

recalled, "I was scared to death, because those lightbulbs
made it just like daylight over there."

Hinton informed

Lieutenant William "Sam" Mace of his dilemma and, after a
moment of thought, Mace calmly walked over to the radio and
unscrewed the light bulbs.26
Meanwhile, the trapped tankers were literally swarmed
over by Chinese infantry.

Chinese soldiers actually leaped

onto the decks and turrets of the tanks, in order to try to
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place explosive charges or throw grenades down an open
hatch.

Tankers took turns spraying each other's tanks with

machinegun fire to knock the Chinese off.

Jim Scoon

remembered:
There was one miserable son of a bitch got on my
tank above the drivers hatch, and I had my
periscope up, and he kept stomping it out. And I
finally got pissed off at him, took my .45
[pistol] and opened a little hatch and boomI Then
he didn't stomp anymore.27
As Hinton's tankers tried to fight their way out of the
trap they had been caught in, Keiser ordered the task force
he had organized to eliminate the main Chinese roadblock on
the Second Division's supply road, to halt their attacks.
The task force had made no headway whatsoever and the men
were exhausted.

Keiser decided to reinforce the task force

the following morning and renew the attack then, preparatory
to moving the entire Second Infantry Division southward down
the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road.28
Just after the first Chinese units struck the 38th
Infantry Regiment and the Turkish Brigade, Reiser's
headquarters received a message from the Second Infantry
Division's Artillery Commander, Brigadier General Loyal M.
Haynes, concerning the proposed withdrawal south.

Due to

the Chinese roadblock on the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road, Haynes
requested permission to withdraw his guns west to Anju and
then south to Sunchon, thus avoiding the block.

This
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request was denied by the Second Division's chief of staff,
Colonel Gerald C. Epley, on the grounds that the Anju Sunchon road was assigned to I Corps, and as such was off
limits to the Second Infantry Division.

Epley did so in

spite of the fact that the 807 6th MASH and other service
units of the Second Infantry Division had already withdrawn
that way to avoid the Chinese.29
At 17 30 hours Keiser ordered the 23rd Infantry Regiment
to withdraw from its position at Kunu-ri and take up a new
defensive position in the hills south of the town.

Captain

Sherman Pratt commanding Baker Company of the 2 3rd Infantry
recalled:
We had been in constant combat for almost a week
without any letup or rest, and most of my men were
on the verge of complete collapse. Many were
little more than walking zombies. I ordered the
company to move out.
'Off and on,' I announced—
off their butts and on the road in the military
colloquial of the [time]. Our column began its
climb, slowly, cautiously, and with enormous
effort. It was dark, cold, and windy, and we had
no idea what the high hill had in store for us.30
The fact that 23rd Infantry Regiment was the strongest
and freshest unit in the Second Infantry Division on the
night of November 29, 1950, says much about the condition of
the rest of the division.
Keiser and his headquarters staff were still trying to
figure out a plan for the Second Division's withdrawal when,
at 202 0 hours, Chinese mortar fire began landing on his
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command post.

Soon the tell-tale "brrrrp" of Chinese sub-

machineguns were heard in the compound, as Chinese
infiltration teams attacked Keiser's headquarters.31
In the midst of this swirling firefight, radio
transmissions continued to arrive at headquarters from the
Second Division's artillery, requesting permission to
withdraw that night rather than waiting until morning and to
use the I Corps road through Anju to reach Sunchon rather
than the blocked Second Division main supply road.

Keiser's

headquarters angrily shot back: "Request to move 17th FA BN
(field artillery battalion) by alternate route through Anju
disapproved.

Second request to displace the 15th and 38th

FA BNs also disapproved.

Div Commander has ordered that all

units stay in position and fight it out."32 The strain of
almost a week of constant battle was beginning to show.
Reiser's headquarters staff, supported by the 2nd
Reconnaissance Company and a battery of guns from the 82nd
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons (AAA AW) succeeded
in driving back the Chinese infantry, but enemy mortar fire
continued to land sporadically on the Second Division's
command post.

Amidst this intermittent shelling, Keiser and

his staff worked feverishly through the night attempting to
formulate a withdrawal plan.

Sometime during the night

while these plans were being formulated, Keiser received a
radio transmission from I Corps commander Major General
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Frank Milburn.
Milburn: How are things going?
Keiser; Bad, right now. We're getting hit in my
CP.
Milburn; Well, come on out my way.33
"My way" meant the I Corps main supply road which ran
south from Anju to Sunchon.

This was the road that the

Second Division's artillery commander had been radioing in
requests all that night to use.

Milburn and Keiser were

good friends, and so Milburn's offer was purely personal
because he lacked the authority to actually authorize the
move.

Any such maneuver by Keiser that would involve moving

his division out of the IX Corps area of operations and into
I Corps' area would need clearance from IX Corps commander
Major General John Coulter.
According to the Second Infantry Division's War Diary,
sometime during the night of November 29th the Second
Division initiated a request to IX Corps for authorization
to move units down the Kunu-ri - Sinanju road, into I Corps'
sector.34 There is no record that IX Corps ever acted on
this request.
The plan that Keiser and his headquarters staff finally
arrived at called for the previously formed task force of
Company C, 38th Infantry Regiment and tank platoons of the
72nd Tank Battalion to be reinforced by the entire 9th
Infantry Regiment.

This force would be supported by the
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Second Division artillery and would drive south to eliminate
the Chinese roadblock on the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road, thus
clearing a path for the Second Infantry Division to withdraw
down.

By this time the 9th Infantry Regiment was a

"regiment" in name only.
Colonel Charles Sloane's 9th Infantry Regiment had
begun

the Battle ofthe Chongchon River with approximately

2,800

soldiers.

By the night of November 29, 1950, Sloane

could only muster approximately 400 dazed and exhausted men.
When Sloane was summoned to Keiser's headquarters and handed
his assignment, he brought this fact to the attention of
Keiser and his staff, but they were not too concerned.35
Keiser and his staff assured Sloane that the Chinese
fireblock was shallow and lightly held, and they promised
that his regiment would be reinforced with tanks as well as
receive both air and artillery support.

With this assurance

Sloane accepted his assignment, and left to prepare his men
for the job ahead.36
Despite the inability of the Second Division to remove
the Chinese from the high ground along its proposed
withdrawal route, Keiser apparently remained convinced that
this enemy force in his rear was not a serious threat.
Overwhelming numbers of Chinese were pressing his division
on three sides, and the threat posed by any infiltration
force on his rear was decided to be minor compared to the
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danger threatening the division in other sectors of the
front.37
Meanwhile Captain Reginald Hinton's tankers were still
under close attack by surrounding Chinese infantry and were
trying to find a way out of their predicament on the Kaechon
- Kunu-ri road.

By the early morning hours of November

30th, Hinton still had two tank platoons stuck on the road
and blocked from further movement by the wrecked and
abandoned Turkish vehicles in front of them.

When the first

rays of dawn gave Hinton's men enough light to see what they
were doing, Corporal Jim Scoon decided that the best way out
was to try and smash through the abandoned Turkish
vehicles.38 Shifting the big Sherman into low gear, with
his tank commander Sergeant First Class Bob Sevy in the
turret giving directions, Scoon moved the tank up against
the first truck in front of them, and pushed it over the
edge of the road and down the steep drop to the right.
Scoon continued on down the road, shoving the abandoned
trucks and jeeps right over the side, until he finally came
up against something that wouldn't budge.39
That "something" turned out to be the remains of a tank
that the Chinese had been able to destroy in their close
assaults of the past few hours.

Unable to proceed any

further, Sevy and Scoon started to wonder if they were ever
going to get out of this mess alive.40
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A worried Captain Hinton finally received a message
that Sergeant Perrone in one of the trapped tanks had found
a place where he thought the tanks could slide down the
sharp drop on their right, and then drive out through a dry
wash.

Hinton radioed back "For God's sake you might as well

try it, even if you tip the tank over, because you can't sit
there!"

After a short-while Hinton's radio crackled again:

"Perrone is down with that tank, and we are going to follow
him out."

Recalled SFC Bob Sevy:

We looked the situation over [and] we decided we
was going right over the side of the hill. And it
was purt near straight down. We unloaded the crew
and turned the big gun around and Jim, good ol'
Jim [tank driver Jim Scoon] he got in there and
drove it right over the side, and when she hit
bottom boy she just went "Kawop!" We got back in
the tank and started up the [draw], making our way
back to where we thought the line was. I mean we
had no idea because we were completely lost and we
were the only few out there, just two tanks.41
As the morning of November 30th dawned, the skies were
cloudy and there was a hint of snow in the air.
the men of the Second Infantry Division,

Unknown to

the Chinese were

already in ambush position along the division's withdrawal
route to Sunchon.

The men of the Second Infantry Division

had one final horror to endure before their battle would be
over.

That horror awaited them along a one-lane gravel road

which wound south through a narrow valley, and into the jaws
of the Dragon.
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CHAPTER VI
IN THE JAWS OF THE DRAGON
"That road wound through a valley of sorrows.
The God of Death himself hovered over that road,
with heavy, beating wings."
General Paik Sun Yup

As the first rays of sunlight began to penetrate the
early morning mist of November 30, 1950, the men of the
United States Second Infantry Division mounted up on tanks,
jeeps, and trucks and began to roll south from Kunu-ri
towards Sunchon.

The Second Infantry Division was the last

unit in the Eighth Army still engaged in combat with the
Chinese, and was finally being ordered by Eighth Army
commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker to move south to
safety.

Major General Laurence Keiser assigned his 23rd

Infantry Regiment the usually hazardous job of serving as
rear guard for the Second Division as it withdrew.

As the

men of the 23rd Regiment watched their comrades move out,
they had no idea that this time, their assignment would save
many of their lives.
As the Second Infantry Division prepared to make its
withdrawal, Keiser ordered the 38th Infantry Regiment to
assist the remnants of the 9th Regiment in clearing the road
to the south.

Captain Reginald Hinton, who commanded the

Tank Company of the 38th Regiment, recalled:
162
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We arrived on the main road, and halted at the top
of a hill. We could see fire coming from the top
of the next hill to our front which overlooked the
road which wound through the valley below.
Suddenly, General Keiser appeared. He came up to
my tank and told me that the 9th Regiment was
trying to reduce the enemy occupying the hill
overlooking our withdrawal route. He then asked
me if I thought I could run through what he
described as a roadblock. I replied that my
tankers had been running one roadblock after
another and could not see why we could not take on
one more. It was my understanding at the time,
that this so called road block was only a few
yards deep. I was then told that the plan was for
the 9th Infantry to continue its attack, while my
Tank Company would spearhead the column composed
of the rest of the Second Division, which would
barrel down the road and run through the block.1
Riding aboard Hinton's lead tank was Lieutenant Charley
Heath.

Heath was attached to Headquarters Company of the

38th Regiment.

Coming out of Kunu-ri though Heath, like

others, found the best ride available.

Heath clambered

aboard Lieutenant William "Sam*' Mace's Sherman tank.
Clinging to the sides of the big tank, Heath stared
anxiously at the bleak hills rising ever more precipitously
on either side of the road.

The area of the previous

night's firefight was reached, and the lead units in the
column halted and deployed for battle.

Amazingly though,

little resistance was offered by the few Chinese seen.

A

wave of relief swept through the ranks, as word was quickly
passed that the block was clear.

The infantry rapidly

remounted their vehicles, and the long column once again
began snaking its way forward.2
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As Heath's tank rounded a sharp bend in the road,
however, they came upon a group of wrecked vehicles.
great column came grinding to a halt.

The

While men cursed, and

drivers blared their horns, Heath and his fellow travellers
on the tank dismounted and moved towards the wrecked
vehicles.

The vehicles were badly shot up, and as Heath

walked towards a large truck he saw a body.

The blood on

the man was dark, and coagulated, ice forming on his open
wounds.

As Heath neared the man, he saw he was still alive.

"Me Turk, me Turk,” the man mumbled.

As cold as he was at

that moment, Heath still felt an icy chill sweep down his
spine.

The Turkish convoy had reported being ambushed, but

they had already passed that point on the road several miles
back.

What the Turks had failed to communicate, was that

they had actually been ambushed twice on this same stretch
of road.

That meant that the roadblock was neither shallow

nor lightly defended.3
The Second Infantry Division had unwittingly driven
headlong into a Chinese trap.

The entire Chinese 113th

Division had side-slipped past the open right flank of the
Second Division, and gotten into position along its
withdrawal route south.4 What had been thought to be a
shallow roadblock several hundred yards deep, was instead a
gauntlet of fire stretching for six miles along both sides
of the road.
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As Heath's mind began to race, the ghastly cacophony of
bugles blasted across the narrow valley, and Chinese
machinegunners concealed on either side of the road opened
fire at near point blank range into the halted column.
Trucks filled with men disintegrated under the concentrated
fire, bursting into flame.

Soon the narrow road was clogged

with burning and disabled vehicles, as men dove for the
cover of drainage ditches.
fought back.

Some men ran, others turned and

Either way, the Chinese gunners killed hero

and coward alike with their deadly fire.

The Second

Division's officers soon lost contact with their troops, and
in that frightful situation it became a matter of every man
for himself.

Heath scrambled back aboard his tank, just as

the driver gunned the engine and flattened the disabled jeep
which blocked their path.

Heath and his fellow riders swept

down the road and cleared the ambush without losing a man.
They would be the lucky ones.5
Captain Reginald Hinton, further back in the column,
was soon on the radio, calling for air strikes to be laid
down on both sides of the road.
Fortunately the 38th Infantry S-3 Air Officer was
back in the column someplace and picked up this
request. The air response came quickly. These
aircraft were P-51's [sic] and strafed at low, and
I mean low, level. This succeeded in suppressing
the Chinese for a little while. The column began
moving again, although at an agonizingly slow
pace.6
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Behind Hinton, the vehicles of the 82nd AAA (anti
aircraft artillery) Battalion began to blast the surrounding
hillsides with concentrated fire from their twin-4Omm
cannons and Quad-.50 machineguns.

Commanding the 82nd AAA

was Lt. Colonel Walter Killilae and he remembered the
battle:
We were receiving small arms and machinegun fire
from what appeared to be small hay stacks. I got
out of my jeep and ran to an M-19 to direct its
fire on the stacks. The Chinese fire slackened,
and the column began moving again. Further down
the road, the mortar and machinegun fire became so
intense that I dived into a ditch on the left side
of the road. I and Colonel Messinger [Executive
Officer for the 9th Regiment] were cowering there
when John Hector, CO of the 37th Field Artillery
came along. He suggested that we get out and help
him to try and get the stalled column moving
again. I credit him with saving our lives, as we
would have surely been killed had we stayed where
we were.7
19 year-old Billy Smith was a Corporal in the 9th
Regiment's Reconaissance Company, and he and his comrades
found themselves with Killilae's AW vehicles.
The road was total gridlock. You could have
walked faster than that column was moving. A
particularly heavy concentration of fire knocked
our jeep off the side of the road, and we found
ourselves next to this M-19 [anti-aircraft
vehicle]. That M-19 was blasting away at the
Chinese with its 40mm cannons, and soon the
Chinese fire died down. My squad leader had
fought in World War II, and he told us to stay
together, and stay close to that M-19. And so we
did. Every time we took fire, those twin 40's
would knock out the Chinese gun. And when the
Chinese tried to rush the M-19, we drove them off
with our small arms fire. We made a pretty good
team, and we managed to make it through the
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Chinese fire gauntlet.8
Other surviving members of the 9th Infantry Regiment
were also trying to make their way out.

PFC Robert Bruce,

.1

in spite of his wounded hands, had been assigned to drive a
2 1/2 ton truck filled with other wounded men.

When the

Chinese ambush took place, the truck that was just a few
feet in front of Bruce on the jammed road, was struck on
both sides by Chinese machinegun fire.

The men inside the

truck were literally blown apart by the concentrated fire,
and their blood splattered across Bruce's windshield.

The

stricken vehicle began to burn, and Bruce could see that
there were still wounded men inside it.9
Stopping his truck, Bruce started to climb down, and
try to rescue some of the men.

But an officer came running

up from one of the vehicles behind Bruce, and screamed at
him to get back in the truck and keep moving.

"The only

chance we have", the officer told Bruce, "is to keep this
damn column moving.
that's an order!"

You are not to stop for anything, and
Bruce climbed back into the driver's

seat, shifted his truck into low gear, and managed to
maneuver it around the burning vehicle in front of him.

The

screams of the wounded men slowly burning to death in the
truck would stay with him forever.10
By this time, the entire road was clogged with burning
vehicles, and the roadside ditches filled with the charred
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and bloodied remains of their former occupants.

Many of

these hideously wounded men were not dead, however, but
rather lay screaming in agony alongside the road.

Bullets

began slamming into Bruce's truck, and screams from behind
him signaled that the wounded men in the back of the truck
were being hit.
There seemed to be no way out of this trap to Bruce, as
another vehicle to his front was struck by a Chinese mortar
round and literally disintegrated in a blinding flash.
Bruce swerved his big truck around the flaming debris, the
sickening thud of his tires running over the bodies of
American soldiers filling his ears.

Whether the men on the

roadside that he had just run over were dead, or only
wounded, Bruce tried not to think about.

His responsibility

was to the men in his truck.
In addition to the litter cases in the back of the
truck, Bruce had three other men piled into the cab of the
vehicle with him, all pounded, and all just as scared as he
was.

Though his hands hurt, it was Bruce's head that ached

horribly now.

The concussion he had suffered from the

Chinese hand grenade five days earlier still pained him, and
the inside of his ears had begun to bleed as well, the blood
running in little streams down the sides of his cheeks.

The

man next to Bruce was the calmest of the group, and he kept
repeating in a soothing voice: "Just get us out of here
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Bobby, just get us out of here Bobby."11
Weaving the big truck down the icy road, dodging
Chinese machinegun and mortar fire, as well as the other
vehicles in the column, Bruce finally drove through the
narrow pass that marked the end of the Chinese ambush area.
Bruce skidded to a stop on the icy road, as he reached the
position of the British 27th Brigade, which was trying to
hold open the south end of the ambush area for the trapped
Americans.
Bruce nursed his badly damaged truck to a nearby aid
station, which was already overflowing with casualties.
Bruce told the orderlies at the aid station that he had a
truckful of wounded men, and several of the orderlies came
over to his truck to help unload the litter cases.

When

they dropped the gate on the back of the truck, however,
their eyes were met with a scene of utter horror.

Almost

everyone in the back of the truck had been struck by Chinese
fire coming through the ambush.

Blood stood several inches

deep on the floor of the truck and many of the men were
dead.

Bruce recoiled back from the sight, staggered away,

and began vomiting.

His ears began to bleed again.12

Other men had their trucks hit and disabled.
Abandoning their knocked out vehicles, these men walked
along the road, desperately seeking another vehicle to climb
aboard.

Some scrambled aboard passing trucks, others were
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savagely kicked or punched, and knocked away from already
overcrowded vehicles.
Staff Sergeant Robert Hammersmith came through the
Chinese ambush on foot, leading his squad, and firing into
the hills at the Chinese.

Laying alongside the road were a

group of wounded men, and one of them recognized him.
"Hammer!" the man called out.

Hammersmith walked over, and

saw that the soldier was a man from his company.

The man

(both he and Hammersmith were 18 years old at the time) was
crying, and cradling his arm, as he had been shot through
the elbow.

"I'm scared Hammer," the man sobbed.

going to be alright," Hammersmith replied.

"It's

Just then, a

truck carrying wounded men was forced to halt near them, as
the motor column continued its "herky-jerky" pace through
the ambush.13
When the truck halted, Hammersmith helped his wounded
friend to his feet, and walked him over to the back of the
truck.

"There's no damn room here!" one of the riders

snarled at Hammersmith as he tried to put his wounded friend
aboard.

Noticing that the person who had spoken was not

wounded, Hammersmith told the man to get out of the truck
and let the wounded man aboard.

When the man responded with

further obscenities, Hammersmith reached up, grabbed the man
by his shirt collar, and yanked him out of the truck,
sending him sprawling onto the road.

Then Hammermith
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boosted his friend up into the truck, and told him to stay
there.

"And that was the last I ever saw of the man,"

Hammersmith recalled of his friend.14
To the north, Colonel Paul Freeman's 23rd Infantry
Regiment was continuing to hold off the pursuing Chinese,
and protect the division artillery, which was placed under
his care until it could move south.

But as Freeman's men

fought off attack after attack, their attention was being
drawn to the scene of horror unfolding behind them.

As

minutes became hours, Freeman still awaited word authorizing
him to withdraw.

But the sounds of battle continued to

drift up to him, and the smoke from burning vehicles could
be clearly seen in the dull November skies.

Freeman was not

sure exactly what was happening on the south road to
Sunchon, but he feared the worst.

Casting an anxious eye at

the sun which now was sinking in the leaden Korean skies,
Freeman knew he had to act.

The Chinese had been hitting

him with heavy attacks in broad daylight.

If they were this

strong during the day, then God help him when nightfall
came.15
Freeman called a conference with his battalion
commanders, as well as the artillery battalion commanders,
and other various infantry elements awaiting their turn to
move south to Sunchon.

Freeman told them that he felt that

the road south was hopelessly blocked, and that there was no
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way they could make it out before sundown.

Freeman then

notified them that he had received authorization from
division headquarters to withdraw down the alternate retreat
route to the west through Anju.

The other commanders not

attached to the 23rd Infantry Regiment balked at Freeman's
suggestion because they had orders to use the south road.
Freeman told them to do what they wanted, but that he was
pulling out and moving west before nightfall.16
Behind the cover of a thunderous artillery barrage laid
down by the remaining artillery, Freeman and the 23rd moved
west to safety.

The Second Division artillery, as well as

what was left of the 9th Regiment, the 2nd Engineer Combat
Battalion, and other service units were unable to clear the
trap before darkness.

These men would spend the night of

November 30, 1950, in Hell.
As night fell across the battlefield, the U.S. aircraft
that had been protecting the column were forced to return to
base, leaving the survivors of the Second Infantry Division
to fend for themselves.

Incredibly, although no other unit

of Eighth Army was engaged in battle on the night of
November 30, no attempt was made by Eighth Army high command
to organize a relief column to rescue the trapped remnants
of the Second Infantry Division.17 The men of the Second
were abandoned to their fate.
Sergeant Harry Lohmeyer of the 2nd Engineers was one of
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those still on the road when night fell:
It was after dark when our vehicles began moving
towards the pass ctt the end of the gauntlet.
As
we neared it, the enemy took charge and blew us to
Hell. People, equipment, vehicles were blowing
up, tracers all around. The Chinese charged down
the hillsides right at us. Our artillery
uncoupled from their trucks, lowered their sights
and fired point blank into the Chinese. Great
balls of flame rolled along the ground at the
oncoming enemy. We were ordered out of the
trucks, and after that it was every man for
himself. The Chinese were all over us, and the
fighting became hand-to-hand. In the pitch black
darkness, it was difficult to distinguish friend
from foe and I remember grabbing men by the neck
to check for dog tags, before killing them. A
couple of us managed to clear the melee, and moved
west over the hills. We walked all that night,
and well into the next day. After about 18 hours,
a U.S. plane spotted us, and dropped messages
telling us which direction to go in and the enemy
locations. When we finally linked up with a First
Cavalry Division patrol, I had just two rounds of
ammo left.18
Not all of the men trapped on the road on the night of
November 30, 1950, were as fortunate as Lohmeyer.

PFC Thomas

Kappell, also a member of the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion,
was in a truck several hundred yards behind Lohmeyer, when
the Chinese rushed the column.

After engaging in desperate

hand-to-hand combat, Kappell and several other members of
his platoon broke free and headed into the hills.

There

they joined up with other stragglers, until they had a group
of almost one hundred men, which included many South
Koreans.

A lieutenant was the ranking member of the group,

and so he assumed command.

Kappell recalled that the
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lieutenant was very inexperienced, and had apparently become
confused during the battle.

As a result, when the

lieutenant led the group away from the ambush area, instead
of heading south to safety, he took them north by mistake.19
Kappell's ragged band staggered into a North Korean
village, shortly after dawn on December 1.

They thought

they had reached friendly lines, but then Chinese soldiers
began emerging from the small huts, and Kappell suddenly
realized that they had stumbled into an enemy held village.
Kappell's group tried to remain calm and, keeping their
heads down and not speaking, they tried to walk right on
through the village.

At first the bluff worked, as the

half-light of dawn combined with the presence of the South
Koreans in the group to conceal their identity.

Right at

the edge of the village, however, a suspicious Chinese
sentry challenged the group.

One of the South Koreans spoke

Chinese, and he tried to answer the sentry.

Kappell was not

sure exactly what was said but, whatever it was, it didn't
lower the suspicions of the sentry, who called out to the
other guards nearby.20
At that point, everyone decided that the "jig was up",
and took off running.

The startled sentries fired wildly,

and Kappell's group raced out of the village.

Emerging from

the village, however, Kappell discovered that the hamlet was
just one small part of a vast encampment of Chinese, which
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they had foolishly walked right into the middle of.
As bugles began to blare, and Chinese machinegun
bullets began tearing through the air around them, Kappell
and the others saw a railroad tunnel, with what looked to be
Chinese railroad workers milling about the entrance,
approximately 800 yards away.

Assuming that troops working

on the railroad would be less heavily armed than normal
Chinese infantry, Kappell and the others ran towards the
tunnel, hoping to at least find cover from the fire of the
pursuing Chinese from the village, and perhaps even find a
train to commandeer.
After running several hundred yards towards the tunnel,
however, several hidden Chinese machineguns emplaced near
the entrance of the tunnel opened fire on Kappell's group.
These machineguns cut down several men and the others dove
onto the hard, frozen ground, as bullets whizzed over their
heads.

With absolutely no cover, and completely surrounded

by literally thousands of Chinese, the decision was made to
surrender.

One of the South Koreans, who spoke Chinese,

called out that they and the Americans wanted to surrender,
and the Chinese machinegunners ceased firing.

By this time,

however, the Chinese troops in the village had caught up
with Kappell's group, and were firing at them.

Many of the

bullets from the pursuing Chinese went high, and landed
among the Chinese machinegunners in front of Kappell.21
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Thinking that the Americans had started shooting at
them again, the Chinese machingunners opened fire once more,
raking the ground with bulletts.

Caught in a vicious cross

fire, Kappell was struck through the foot, but dozens of
other men were cut to shreds.

Grabbing several of the dead

men, Kappell piled their lifeless bodies on top of himself
as a shield against the bullets, and then lay still for what
seemed like an eternity.

Finally, the Chinese fire

slackened, and then stopped.

Kappell waited breathlessly,

praying that he would somehow live through this nightmare.
There was a sudden babbling of oriental voices near him, and
then the bodies on top of him were yanked clear, and Kappell
stared up into the barrells of Chinese rifles and submachineguns pointed straight at him.

Kappell was taken

prisoner, but of the approximately 100 men who had broke
free of the gauntlet with him, only three others remained
alive.

Kappell was transported north several days later,

and would spend the rest of the war in a prison camp.22
Late on the evening of November 30, 1950, Captain
Reginald Hinton pulled up in his bullet-riddled jeep, at a
headquarters tent belonging to an Eighth Army engineer unit.
Hoping that the engineers might be able to tell him where he
could locate other elements of the Second Infantry Division,
Hinton climbed out of his jeep, and walked into the tent.
Hinton was bedraggled, and haggard looking after five
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days and nights of battle.

His uniform was filthy and

stained with blood from his wounded wrist, which had been
shattered by a Chinese bullet during the ambush.

Hinton's

appearance startled the clean-cut engineers as he strode
into their immaculate tent.

"Could you tell me where the

.i

Second Infantry Division is reforming at?", Hinton asked.
"You from the Second Division?", the engineer's commanding
officer asked in an astounded tone.
his head in the affirmative.
out!" the engineer exclaimed.
still here."23

Hinton wearily shook

"We just heard they got wiped
"No," Hinton replied, "we're
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CHAPTER VII
AFTERMATH
"There stood before General Dumas a man in a ragged brown
coat, dishevelled/ his eyes red rimmed and glaring.
Underneath his coat he wore the rags and shreds of
a discolored and filthy uniform.
'Here I am then,' the
newcomer exclaimed.
'But who are you?' the general cried."
'What! Don't you recognize me? I am Marshal Ney: the
rearguard of the Grand Army!
I have fired the last shot
on the bridge at Kovno.
I have thrown the last of our
muskets into the Niemen and have made my way here
across a hundred fields of snow.'"
Raymond Horricks, Marshal Nev

The heroic delaying action fought by the men of the
United States Second Infantry Division in the Battle of the
Chongchon River, greatly slowed the Chinese Second Phase
Offensive and helped to save the Eighth United States Army
in Korea from destruction.

Thus the main objective of the

Chinese offensive was foiled.1 But the price paid by the
Second Infantry Division was heavy.
Out of a pre-battle strength of approximately 15,000
men, the Second Infantry Division lost over 4,500 soldiers
killed, wounded, or missing in the Battle of the Chongchon
River.2 This staggering total remains the heaviest
casualties ever suffered by a United States Army or Marine
Corps division in a single engagement in the post-World War
II era.

This shocking "butcher's bill", and the disastrous

ambush on the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road, would cost Major
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General Laurence Keiser his command.
Officially, Keiser was evacuated to Japan from Korea
for treatment of pneumonia, and on December 5, 1950, was
relieved of his command by Eighth Army commander Lieutenant
General Walton Walker.3 S.L.A. Marshall, who was in Korea
when Keiser was relieved, relates that Keiser went out of
his way to demonstrate to him that he was not ill.

Keiser

was angry, Marshall reported, and felt like he was being
made the scapegoat for the Second Division's defeat at the
Chongchon River.4 Keiser retired from the United States
Army in 1954, a broken man.
Eighth Army commander, Lieutenant General Walton
Walker, was killed in a jeep accident just weeks after he
had relieved Keiser of his command.

MacArthur replaced

Walker with Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway.

In an

effort to better understand his new command, Ridgway wrote
to his former West Point classmate, Laurence Keiser, asking
him for information about what had happened along the
Chongchon River.

Keiser never replied and years later would

remark about the battle: "It is over— it is done.

Let it

lie. "5
Although Keiser lost his command, some of the highest
ranking officers to serve in Korea praised the Second
Infantry Division for its valor in the Battle of the
Chongchon River.

United Nations Supreme Commander General
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Douglas MacArthur, described the Second Infantry Division's
battle as a "notable rearguard action which enabled the
Eighth Army to break contact and avoid any enemy flanking
movement."6 General Matthew Ridgway, Walker's and later
MacArthur's replacement, called the Second Infantry a
"gallant division" that was "badly mauled...as it was
holding the Chongchon River so the balance of Eighth Army
could cross."7
General Paik Sun Yup, commanding general of the ROK 1st
Division at the time of the battle, and destined to rise to
supreme command of the South Korean army wrote: "The U.S.
2nd Division propped up the unraveling line (at the Battle
of the Chongchon River) until the very last minute."8
In December 1950, the Second Infantry Division's war
was far from over, and in the month's that followed it would
avenge its losses at the Battle of the Chongchon River.
From January 31 - February 15, 1951, the Second Division's
23rd Infantry Regiment made a glorious stand at the siege of
Chipyong-ni.

Surrounded by five Chinese divisions, the men

of the 23rd Regiment turned back wave after wave of Chinese
attackers at bayonet-point. When the battle ended, 7,855
Chinese corpses lay strewn across the Korean countryside.9
When spring came to Korea in 1951, the Chinese made
what would turn out to be their last attempt to achieve a
military victory in the Korean War.

Smoke from forest fires
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again filled the skies over Korea, as 12 0,000 Chinese
soldiers massed in front of the U.S. Second Infantry
Division and the ROK III Corps.

A captured enemy officer

revealed that the objective of the forthcoming Chinese
attack was to destroy the Second Infantry Division for
having disrupted so many former Chinese offensives.10
The Chinese assault began on May 15, 1951, and appeared
to be an exact replica of their plan of attack at the
Chongchon River.

A massive blow shattered the ROK III

Corps, exposing the Second Division's right flank and again
threatening it with encirclement and destruction.

But the

men of the Second Division had learned much about their
Chinese foe during the past six months.
Because of their experience at the Chongchon River, the
men of the Second Infantry Division had anticipated the
attack against their flank, and had already formed a
defensive line along that sector, complete with barbed wire
and minefields.

Wave after wave of Chinese slammed into the

Second Division, but they were thrown backward by a
hailstorm of artillery and small arms fire.

When the smoke

of the battlefield cleared on May 22, 1951, a shocking total
of 90,000 Chinese lay dead or wounded in front of the lines
of the Second Infantry Division.11
In conclusion, it is apparent from the evidence I have
presented in this thesis, that the officers and men of the
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United States Second Infantry Division fought bravely at the
Battle of the Chongchon River and performed their duty in
the highest traditions of the United States Army.

The

defeat of the Second Infantry Division at the Chongchon
River may be attributed to the overwhelming numerical
superiority of a veteran Chinese army, combined with the
suddenness of the enemy's offensive, his having completely
surprised the Americans, and the novelty of his tactics.
In spite its tactical defeat along the Chongchon the
Second Infantry Division still helped deny the enemy his
ultimate objective of destroying the Eighth Army.
the battle was lost, honor was not.

Although

It is my hope that this

thesis will help to insure that the courageous men of the
United States Second Infantry Division, will forever be
remembered for their epic struggle with the Chinese along
the banks of the Chongchon River.
These courageous men walk among us yet today, and
behind the kindly eyes of grandfathers, one can still see
the fire of the warrior's soul.

These men remember a time

when the snows of Korea were stained red with the blood of
heroes.

It was a time for courage.

sacrifice.

It was a time for

It was the time of the Dragon.
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